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The image of North Korea as an enemy in the United States (US) ‘war on terror’ has driven much of the 
Bush Administration policy toward North Korea.1 The continuous negative portrayal of North Korea by 
Bush has been counterproductive, as his tendency to take a hawkish line toward North Korea in areas of 
nuclear development and Human Rights has exacerbated the nuclear threat.2 By openly stating that he 
‘loathed’ Kim Jong-Il and would like to see the regime ‘topple’ for example, explain North Korean views 
that the US presents a clear danger to their states existence and thus the need to maintain and develop 
nuclear capabilities as a deterrent, rather than compromise.3 In addition, Bush lumped together 
countries that are more different than alike in proclaiming Iran, Iraq and North Korea as part of the ‘Axis 
of Evil’. This essentially inhibited Bush from pursuing an adequate and specific policy to neutralise the 
distinctive nature of the North Korean nuclear threat.4 The North Korean nuclear situation is distinctive 
in the sense that, unlike Iran and Iraq, North Korea has a fully functioning nuclear programme that North 
Korea has on countless occasions vocally reaffirmed as a security tool, very different to Iran’s claims of 
nuclear development as an energy source.5 Furthermore, this provocative policy toward North Korea, 
with the sole purpose of achieving regime change in Pyongyang,6 turned a previous threat made by 
North Korea in 1993 into actually reality when North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT).7 North Korea remains the first state ever to withdraw from the NPT.8 
After having declared itself a nuclear power, North Korea conducted a test explosion of a nuclear device 
in October 2006.9 Added to this was the recent rocket launch in April 2009 violating United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1718.10 The most important clause under UNSCR 1718 condemns any 
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nuclear or atomic testing by North Korea.11   Such volatility becomes disturbing when demonstrated by a 
country with enough plutonium for up to eight nuclear weapons, four times what it had three years 
ago.12 This statistic clearly illustrates the potential power North Korea could gain as it continues to 
further its nuclear developments. At the end of the Bush presidency therefore, a lack of genuine 
engagement failed to put an end to the fifty-year old crisis over Korea.13 North Korea continues to date 
with threats of nuclear and inter-continental ballistic missile tests.14  
This study thus questions the reasons and motives of adopting such a policy that failed to neutralise a 
nuclear threat that led to the erosion of NPT regime compliance norms-the medium through which 
Korean Peninsula developments drive other proliferation dangers.15 This discussion in addition will 
highlight the Bush Administrations pessimism over multilateral approaches to non-proliferation. The 
importance of such questions raises issues around an unstable and uncertain international security 
regime as a whole. In this study the international security regime refers to the nuclear security regime 
aimed at non-proliferation. In this way, the study questions the implications such a failed policy has 
today regarding the international security regime in which North Korea was able to withdraw from the 
NPT without having suffered serious consequences and continues today to violate UNSC Resolutions. 
The study will then suggest various recommendations for the current Obama Administration as the need 
to neutralise an ever-growing North Korean nuclear threat becomes ever more pressing.  
The first chapter of this study will begin with a discussion around the reasons for and implications of a 
nuclear North Korea. North Korea is a state whose leadership believes that state and regime survival 
against any threat lies mainly in the development of nuclear weapons.16 The possibility then of the North 
Korean leadership giving up on nuclear developments while seeking to protect sovereignty and ensure 
regime survival is greatly weakened. Furthermore, concerns only increase when looking to the 
                                                          
11
 Anonymous, “Solidarity on Sanctions?” in Business Asia, Vol. 38, Iss. 20, http://0-
proquest.umi.com.innopac.wits.ac.za/pqdweb?index=8&did=1162624221&SrchMode=1&sid=7&Fmt=3&VInst=PR
OD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1255872637&clientId=58117,  October 2006. 
12
 O’Hanlon, M. Op Cit. 
13
 Armstrong, K.C. Op Cit.  p. 36. 
14
 “North Korea Threatens Nuclear Tests”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8024235.stm, 29 April 
2009. 
15
 Huntley, W.L., “U.S. Policy Toward North Korea in Strategic Context: Tempting Goliaths Fate”, in Asian Survey, 
Vol. 47, No. 3, 2007, p. 467. 
16
 Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea’s Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations,” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, 
Winter 2000-2001, pp. 542-543. 
5 | P a g e  
 
distinctive nature of the North Korean situation. North Korea is not described as a ‘rational adversary’17 
or considered a ‘rag-tag’ Third World regime compared to that of Afghanistan or Libya. North Korea on 
the other hand is seen as the world’s most intransigent and unyielding totalitarian regime. As such, 
North Korea is seen as a state that has little to gain from peaceful coexistence and little to lose from 
confrontation and thus, in light of this, places a great value on nuclear weaponry.18  
This is what makes the North Korean situation dangerous as this is a country accustomed to subsistence 
whose main goal is state survival based on nuclear acquisition against all threats. The chapter will look 
to the instability, suspicion and increasing tension North Koreas nuclear developments have within East 
Asia and in addition, look toward these implications to international security regimes, particularly the 
Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This chapter ultimately seeks to illustrate the dangers of a nuclear North 
Korea and the need therefore to neutralize this situation. This chapter attempts therefore to discuss the 
implications of a nuclear North Korea within the region and toward international regimes. 
This chapter furthermore will include a discussion around traditional power politics. Traditional power 
politics is characterized by impositions that are made by stronger nations onto weaker nations.19 North 
Korea however, is representive of a paradoxical phenomenon known as the ‘power of the weak’.20 In the 
North Korean case, North Korea’s policy of brinkmanship based on its nuclear program is able to 
exercise substantial influence and lead a greater power against its will. As North Korean stakes in 
nuclear issues are directly linked to its own state survival, North Korea will continue to use nuclear 
threats as an important tool to counter any threat to its sovereignty. This chapter will therefore highlight 
the reasons why an aggressive US foreign policy, to be discussed in chapter two, is not effective in 
dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue as it simply encourages North Korean nuclear brinkmanship 
to ensure regime survival. North Korea will continue to use nuclear threats as a defensive tool against 
the US offensive policy21, instead of surrender to the military strength of the US as advocated under the 
concept of traditional power politics. This chapter furthermore, will provide with various evidence 
illustrating the continued development of the North Korean nuclear program and will thus lay the 
foundation for various suggestions calling for a change in US policy to neutralize this growing threat.  
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This chapter will in addition, look to the implications of a nuclear North Korea on international security 
regimes, particularly the NPT. What is significant to note is that North Korea withdrew from the NPT 
without having suffered any meaningful sanctions.22 North Korea’s success in avoiding meaningful 
repercussions sets a negative example for other nations and thereby erodes future arms control and 
proliferation compliance.23 This is a dangerous prospect as other nations could learn from North Korea 
and not abide by proposals set by the NPT. Another concern is raised in addition as the erosion of the 
NPT begins to serve as a medium through which Korean peninsula developments drive other 
proliferation dangers, Iranian ambitions for instance.24 There are various arguments moreover stating 
that the NPT is now under pressure as a result of North Korean non-compliance and withdrawal, making 
the stakes therefore in keeping the NPT viable very high.25  
An important issue which this chapter aims to illustrate furthermore is the reason for North Korea’s 
nuclear developments, based mainly on North Koreas concern with the US military threat.26 North Korea 
fears that the US is determined to overthrow its government and has thus maintained a policy that 
ensures a militarily and economically powerful state to counter this threat.  An important strategy for 
North Korea then is to avoid transparency in missile and nuclear issues in order to build a military 
powerful state or simply creating the perception of North Korea as a military powerful state. North 
Korea thus continues to resist US demands for inspections unless it receives economic compensations 
that would then facilitate economic development. This is what is referred to as North Korea’s defensive 
power against the US offensive power.27 North Koreas military insecurity and economic failure therefore 
have been key factors influencing North Korea’s nuclear development in order to maintain state 
sovereignty. This will then lead to a discussion around the importance of the Juche ideology within 
North Korean foreign policy. The Juche ideology stresses importance on the principles of independence 
and sovereignty and explains North Koreas key foreign policy objective therefore to prevent foreign 
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intervention.28  The issue then, which this chapter aims to highlight, looks to North Koreas nuclear 
developments as an issue of security.29 North Korea has always stated that it will negotiate a verifiable 
end to all nuclear weapons development if the US formally commits to respect North Korean 
sovereignty.30   
The second chapter of this study will then follow from these discussions to outline and explain the 
reasons for a failed Bush policy that followed a hard-line policy of hawk engagement that simply fueled 
North Korean insecurities and ultimately prevented North Korea from negotiating a verifiable end to all 
nuclear developments.  This chapter will provide an in depth analysis and critique of the Bush 
Administrations North Korean policy, determining whether it neutralized or simply aggravated the North 
Korean nuclear situation. This chapter will provide a discussion that attempts to illustrate the aggressive, 
hostile and hard-line policy of hawk engagement, adopted by the Bush Administration, which only 
fueled tensions further as it intensified North Korean insecurities. 
The chapter will begin with an analysis of the Clinton Administrations North Korean policy. This analysis 
will provide with a background and context of US-North Korean relations prior to the arrival of the Bush 
Administration. This analysis aims to illustrate the positive policies of engagement adopted by the 
Clinton Administration that allowed for and facilitated an improvement in US-North Korean relations 
and the containment of the North Korean nuclear threat. The engagement policies adopted by the 
Clinton Administration culminated into the Agreed Framework that promised further improvements in 
US-North Korean relations and showed clear signs of improved North Korean behavior, away from 
aggressive policies of brinkmanship.31 
The Bush Administration however, did not advance and further these policies of engagement. This 
chapter will therefore provide a discussion on the reasons for a more aggressive and hard-line policy of 
hawk engagement as pursued by the Bush Administration. The study will then proceed to analyze the 
implications of this more aggressive, and often hostile, policy.          
The US policy toward North Korea upon the election of the Bush Administration saw a reversal from 
engagement pursued under the Clinton Administration to a hard-line, hawkish approach often described 
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as being deliberately provocative.32 This policy had the sole objective of achieving regime change in 
Pyongyang and therefore adopted a strategy of hawk engagement to build support for action to be 
taken against North Korea to accelerate the collapse of the Kim regime.33  This chapter furthermore 
attempts to illustrate the manner in which the Bush Administrations hard-line policy of hawk 
engagement failed to support the South Korean policy of engagement and went on therefore to strain 
both US-North Korean and inter-Korean relations that did not enhance or work toward stability on the 
peninsula. 34 This chapter furthermore ultimately aims to illustrate and explain the vital issue regarding 
the inability of the Bush Administration to recognize the dynamics of North Korean brinkmanship that 
responds in a threatening manner to a perceived threat.35 The chapter will therefore move on to provide 
with important recommendations that should have been adopted by the Administration instead.  The 
Administration for instance should have continued the engagement policy of the Clinton Administration 
that established a framework for progress that the Bush Administration could have furthered. This is a 
policy objective that should have been adopted by the Bush Administration and demands important 
consideration by the Obama Administration. This chapter therefore ultimately aims to reinforce a vital 
suggestion that genuine engagement provides a better option away from inflexible and uncompromising 
policies that simply fuel tensions leading to greater a possibility of military conflict over the North 
Korean nuclear issue or an arms race in East Asia.36 This chapter will refer to the prospect theory to 
reinforce a key suggestion that illustrates the way in which a more cooperative US that encourages and 
upholds genuine engagement places North Korea in the domain of gain by offering concrete incentives, 
North Korea would then subsequently not risk any gain by continuing with coercive strategies of 
brinkmanship.37 
After having analyzed the failure and shortcomings of the Bush Administration in neutralizing the North 
Korean nuclear threat, the final chapter of this study will look to the Obama Administration and the road 
ahead. This chapter will provide a discussion on the future prospects of US-North Korean relations by 
analyzing the current Administrations North Korean policy. Although it may be early to analyse the 
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current Administrations North Korean policy, it is important to take note of the Administrations 
response to North Koreas recent nuclear tests and provocative behavior to determine the current weak 
points of the Administrations strategy; and to suggest therefore important recommendations for an 
improved US North Korean policy away from the failed Bush Administration policy. 
This chapter will begin with an outline of North Korean actions at the end of the Bush Administration 
term. This outline will provide with a discussion on the traditional strategy of brinkmanship used by 
North Korea and in addition will provide with a new outlook on the dynamics of North Korean 
provocative behavior. This outline will then allow for an analysis on the policy response of the Obama 
Administration; providing an argument that sees certain similarities to the policy response and choice of 
the Bush Administration; and arguments on the other hand that see certain positive policy departures 
from the Bush Administration. The chapter will furthermore, in light of the new outlook on the dynamics 
of North Korea’s provocative behavior, away from the traditional strategies of brinkmanship, suggest 
various recommendations that are needed if the new Administration is to succeed neutralizing the 
North Korean threat. This chapter will provide with various analyses that lead to a concluding 
observation that the Obama Administration cannot risk the failure of the previous Administrations 
contradictory polices of conditionality, nor can the current Administration wait to change and alter 
policy objectives according to North Korean succession. While maintaining the current policy of 
conditionality in insisting that North Korea agree to denuclearization before any incentives are given, 
North Korea will continue building and advancing what they still see as their only option, their nuclear 
program.38 The Obama Administration should therefore avoid the previous Administrations mistake in 
fitting threats to policy, instead of policy to threats.39 
Aim 
This study aims to determine the reasons for the policy choice of the Bush Administration toward North 
Korea and the reasons for its ultimate failure. The study aims to highlight the implications of this failed 
policy on the international security regime due to the Administration’s pessimism over multilateral 
approaches to non-proliferation and heavy reliance on policies of appeasement.40 Finally, by drawing 
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upon the failures of the Bush Administration, the study aims to provide with possible alternatives and 
remedies for the Obama Administration.  
Rationale 
The questions and issues raised in this study provide useful insight into the implications of a failed North 
Korean policy under the Bush Administration, not just within North-East Asia, but toward the 
international security regime as a whole. Withdrawing from the NPT, without having suffered any 
serious consequence or retaliation erodes current NPT compliance norms and this very erosion serves as 
the medium through which Korean Peninsula developments drive other proliferation dangers.41 Thus, 
Iranian leaders for example, would learn important lessons about the consequences they may or may 
not face by following a similar path and how the repercussions might be managed.42 With the erosion of 
security regimes therefore, comes an unstable system where compliance to security norms cannot be 
enforced and thus fails to act as a guarantee for international security and stability, where the potential 
then of volatility and hostility simply remain and may even increase. 
Based on its pessimism over cooperative security arrangements, the Bush Administration was more 
willing to abide by the regional implications of a nuclear North Korea, rather than engage Pyongyang 
directly.43 In addition, the ambivalence toward the implications on the international security regime of 
an eroded NPT further illustrates the Administrations pessimism toward multilateral approaches to non-
proliferation and its distaste for the NPT particularly.44 In analysing the policy therefore of this 
Administration and the reasons for its failure, the study provides insight into role of the US as a 
superpower in the international security regime. In the case of the North Korean nuclear threat, the US 
as a superpower, failed to neutralise a nuclear threat due to its pessimism toward cooperative security 
arrangements and multilateral approaches to non-proliferation. Thus, the recent rocket launch by North 
Korea only deepens international proliferation concerns. Furthermore, experts believe that North Korea 
can capitalise on the data that can be generated by this space vehicle that can then assist further in the 
production of more powerful missiles45  
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By drawing upon these failures and providing alternatives and recommendations to the new 
Administration, the study attempts to determine if the role of the US as a superpower, under the 
Obama administration, will in contrast to Bush, enforce existing multilateral security and opt for 
cooperative security arrangements that could then bring essential change and progress in this ongoing 
nuclear situation. In this way then, the study will add to existing literature by analysing the future of the 
North Korean situation under the new Obama Administration. 
In addition, this study will provide important insight into the implications of adopting policies of 
appeasement. Appeasement can be seen as a more passive approach of pacification, whereby the US 
would pacify the North Koreans through talk and negotiation, rather than adopt a stronger policy of 
confrontation. The very reason North Korea has become a nuclear threat is due to a decade of 
appeasement,46 and what Pyongyang illustrates, is a clear picture of the consequences of 
appeasement.47 The Bush Administration policy for example, adopted a policy of engagement and 
negotiation based on the false expectation that North Korea would eventually denuclearize when in 
reality Pyongyang used this form of appeasement as a deception strategy to gain more time and pursue 
its nuclear ambition.48 The Obama Administration similarly, seems unwilling to exert strong pressure on 
Pyongyang as it desires to continue the six-party talks hoping that negotiation would succeed in 
denuclearising North Korea, this being one of the reasons that informed the failed Bush policy.49 By 
removing North Korea from the US ‘terrorism blacklist’ in October 2008 for example, the US submitted 
to the brinkmanship of North Korea.50 North Korea adopts a strategy of brinkmanship by using nuclear 
weapons as a bargaining tool to attain various demands. More recently, with the North Korean rocket 
launch in April 2009, North Korea has managed to defy the UNSC and will now, most likely simply 
confront the pleas of Obama and others to return to the multilateral six-party talks, which is exactly 
where North Korea wants to be.51  In the six party talks, North Korea will remain in a situation of 
appeasement, gaining ever-greater material and political benefits in exchange for ever more empty 
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promises of denuclearisation.52 These discussions will thus add to existing literature on such policies of 
appeasement in a realist situation.  
According to Madeline Albright, former US Secretary of State, dialogue and negotiation do not equal 
appeasement.53 In her view, dialogue allows the US to work toward creating agreement and thus 
progressing toward an ultimate solution to the North Korean nuclear situation.54 However, in reality, 
North Korea has shown a history of engaging in ‘strategic-deception’ by signing on to such agreements 
but purposefully cheating on them to its own advantage.55 Therefore, such negotiation becomes 
worthless and in the end results in a form of appeasement. Dialogue and negotiation sees an agreement 
created out of a compromise that in the end is not upheld by North Korea. The six party talks provide a 
clear illustration of this situation. Since they were adopted in 2003, the six-party talks have stumbled 
around inconclusively as Pyongyang has simply ignored, stalled, renegotiated and violated many 
agreements.56 The only beneficiary in the end, given the nature of appeasement, has been North 
Korea.57 In violation of various agreements, it has not faced any truly punishing sanctions, in addition to 
gaining the most important resource of all-time, to enhance, conceal and disperse its nuclear program.58 
The five years grace therefore (from 2003-2007), failed to neutralise a threat that today, given the 
continuous policies of appeasement, has more opportunity to gain long-term income from its sale of 
rocket technology to the Middle East and other nations.59  
The implications therefore around policies of appeasement are important to consider as its failure to 
neutralise the North Korean threat now allows this nuclear state to support other nuclear ambitious and 
potentially hostile nations. Such discussions and issues therefore are essential and worth discussing in 
analysing a potentially dangerous situation threatening international peace and stability 
Methodology  
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This study will draw mainly on qualitative analysis that will primarily include the use of journals and 
press commentaries. In addition, the study will include interviews conducted with Bruce Klinger, Bertil 
Lintner and Dr. Jim Hoare. The study will furthermore, provide other interviews with senior and key 
researchers in this field of study. In addition, necessary interviews will be conducted with officials in the 
North and South Korean and US embassies.  
The secondary data collection consists of existing literature on this topic. These include books and 
journal articles including reports and press commentaries. The University of Witwatersrand library, the 
South Africa Institute of International Affairs library and the library of the University of Johannesburg 
will be consulted for the literature and the theoretical application of all works. Furthermore, Internet 
reports, comments and materials will be used in this study.  
A critical analysis will thus be facilitated from all above collected data 
Theoretical Framework 
There are various policy ideas and theories that will be used to frame the issues and research included in 
this study. 
A. Realism vs. Idealism and Institutional liberalism 
Embracing realism as a guiding philosophy, candidate Bush, in his first major foreign policy speech 
stated that ‘a President must be a clear-eyed realist’, using force to counter force.60 In practice however, 
the Bush Administrations doctrines and policies form a different worldview to that proposed by classical 
realism. The North Korean nuclear threat and ongoing nuclear situation is indeed representive of a 
realist condition, where according to classical realists, placing hope in treaties and international laws 
and the spread of democracy amounts in the end to ‘fruitless’ and ‘dangerous’ dreaming.61  This 
however, is the very policy and philosophy adopted by Bush and thus, the reason for its ultimate failure. 
The Bush Administration chose to adopt an ideational approach that represents a ‘core’ versus 
‘periphery’ situation. Like-minded and democratic nations establishing rules and norms to govern 
behaviour fill the core while undemocratic states fill the periphery. The goal of the US policy then, 
according to this approach, has been the goal to persuade major powers to sign on to certain key ideas 
as to how the world should operate. Support for democracy and opposition to terrorism and weapons of 
mass destruction illustrate a key example of ideals that the US believes all states should abide by if 
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peace and stability is to be maintained. The US would then transform these ideals into policies to be 
locked into institutions. This forms the liberal institutionalist strand, whereby policies on weapons of 
mass destruction for instance will be governed under international institutions. An interesting paradox 
emerges however as the idealistic Bush foreign policy is the pursuit of institutionalist and liberal ends in 
a more aggressive and often unilateral manner, contrary to what liberalism purports. In its pursuit for 
instance of universal ‘democratic peace’, democracy is used as a security-tool, by believing a change in 
ideology radically and naturally changes the nature of the threat. Bush thus, in his idealistic endeavours, 
tends to measure his counterparts in politics and world affairs by a moral standard.62 For example, Bush 
openly stated “I loath Kim Jong-Il…I’ve got a visceral reaction to this guy, because he is starving his 
people…it is visceral. Maybe its my religion…but I feel passionate about this.”63 These statements are 
representive of passionate reactions that then further separate Bush’s foreign policy thinking from 
realism that has no space for moral conviction in politics. Another example is evident in Bush’s continual 
call for a US policy that would seek and support the growth of democracy in every nation that ultimately 
represents a US goal to use democracy to end tyranny. 64 In yet another move, guided by an ideational 
predisposition, Bush created the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, an effort to promote human 
rights in North Korea.65 This is a typical example of an idealist approach in which the political ideology of 
state A seeks to conquer the minds of the government of state B.66 
The US under Bush has always illustrated a fundamental strategic interest in supporting democratic 
trends in what it labels unfree or undemocratic nations.67 By adopting freedom, justice and human 
dignity as its foundational pillars that would lead to a growing community of democracies and ensure 
peace and stability, saw idealism triumph over realism in shaping US foreign policy strategies.68 It is 
important to note however that the US policy, under the Bush Administration represented a specific 
form of idealism bent toward overseas democratisation, by force if necessary, challenging the 
prerogative therefore of state sovereignty.69 This has been the main fear of North Korea, the collapse of 
its existence and thus the need to maintain and build its nuclear deterrent to prevent a threat against 
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North Korean sovereignty. Bush policy ideas therefore only exacerbated North Korean fears thereby 
fuelling the nuclear threat. This theory is then clearly applicable to many issues dealt with in this study 
and assists in illustrating the reasons for and implications of the Bush Administration’s North Korean 
policy.  
 
B.  Appeasement and Brinkmanship 
The policy of appeasement is the very reason North Korea has become, and remains a nuclear threat.70 
By simply adopting and maintaining ‘soft policies’ of negotiation, North Korea has been able to continue 
its military brinkmanship by developing nuclear weapons and often simply just threatening the use of 
them in order to attain a suitable outcome and buy more time in solidifying its nuclear deterrent.71 In 
almost all instances, this has worked for North Korea, where it remains in an environment of 
appeasement, gaining ever-greater material and political benefits in exchange for ever more empty 
promises of denuclearisation.72 Nuclear weapons thus act as North Korea’s strongest bargaining tool 
assisting and furthering North Korea’s policy of brinkmanship. 
Passive policies of appeasement prevent not only the US, but all members of the six party talks (South 
Korea, China, Russia and Japan) from taking direct action against North Korea. This policy of 
appeasement therefore prevents North Korea from the full impact of important initiatives aimed to 
counter the North Korean nuclear threat. North Korea for instance is yet to feel the full impact of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 73 Formed in 2003, the PSI stands to counter proliferation efforts.74 
North Korea therefore, in the absence of more direct opposition, is able to continue using its nuclear 
weapons as a bargaining tool to achieve its demands. Explanations and discussions on policies of 
appeasement and brinkmanship will therefore assist in supporting the suggestions made in this study 
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calling for stronger action, away from appeasement, to be taken against North Korea that would restrict 
and prevent North Korea from continuing to use nuclear weapons as a tool to further its own aims.  
C. Prospect theory 
A discussion and explanation of prospect theory will support and frame the solutions set out in this 
study for the prevention of continued policies of appeasement that simply further North Korean 
brinkmanship. The prospect theory proposes that engagement and the provision of incentives would 
prevent the crystallization of conditions under which North Korea calculates aggression and a 
threatening posture as its only course of action.75 Policies of engagement furthermore will facilitate an 
environment of engagement and cooperation by providing with incentives to North Korea thereby 
raising North Korean stakes in negotiations as it now has something to either gain or lose.  As such, 
incentives can be turned into ‘ammunition’ or ‘sticks’ to be used against North Korea if North Korea 
disrupts negotiations with any unruly behavior and the chances therefore of North Korea maintaining 
coercive bargaining is thus greatly lessened. Non-communication, threats and intimidation in contrast, 
pursued by the US under hard-line policies of hawk engagement, stand only to exacerbate 
preemptive/preventive situations in which North Korea is most likely to adopt coercive bargaining and 
aggression based on their vulnerability and insecurity. This is a situation, illustrated by the reasons for 
North Korean traditional strategies of brinkmanship whereby North Korea finds itself in the domain of 
loss, explaining North Korea’s adoption then of nuclear developments as a defensive deterrent to 
prevent this loss, mainly a loss of sovereignty.76   
The prospect theory therefore suggests a policy of engagement instead, that provides various incentives 
to North Korea thereby raising North Korean stakes in the status quo; that allows the US furthermore to 
tactically build a coalition of punishment should North Korea defect. Engagement then, in this manner, 
facilitates a policy that will ensure progress and at the same time, maintains a security net to respond to 
North Korean defiance.77 Applying this theory to North Korea therefore, preemptive or preventive strike 
will always be an option for North Korea, which aims to avoid the certainty of loss, given an 
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uncompromising and inflexible US policy.78 If faced however, with a more cooperative US that 
encourages and upholds genuine engagement that places North Korea in the domain of gain by offering 
concrete incentives, North Korea would not risk any gain by continuing with coercive strategies of 
brinkmanship.79 
These ideas and theories will provide the framework to explain the methodological implications they 
have toward the main issues raised in this study.  
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Chapter Two 
2.The North Korean Nuclear Threat. 
“It is the disposition and will of our people and army…to answer dialogue with dialogue and strength 
with strength.”(Kim Kwang-chin, Vice Minister of the People’s Armed Forces)80 
The North Korean weapons program dates back to the 1980’s, where its nuclear aspirations have always 
been problematic ever since it joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985. 81 North Korea 
considers its nuclear program a vital element of national security, against the suspected United States 
(US) threat and a vital element that ensures the continued existence of the Kim family regime.82 In 
addition, North Korea has learnt that nuclear weapons or even the threat of developing nuclear 
weapons has become its best bargaining tool. 83   
This chapter attempts to outline the reasons for and implications of a nuclear North Korea. Nuclear 
weapon development by North Korea forms an important strategy of national security against the US 
threat. Secondly, North Korean nuclear developments are considered a vital element that ensures the 
continued existence of the Kim family regime by providing power to the ruling regime to resist all 
threats to North Koreas sovereignty. This will then lead to a discussion on the implications of a nuclear 
North Korea within the region and toward international regimes. The chapter will look to the instability, 
suspicion and increasing tension North Koreas nuclear developments have within East Asia and in 
addition, look toward these implications to international security regimes, particularly the NPT. 
Furthermore, the chapter will provide a discussion on North Koreas strategy of brinkmanship. Nuclear 
weapons act as North Koreas most important political bargaining tool used to achieve demands; this 
exacerbates tensions further as North Korea is able to bluff, threaten and stall with negotiations on a 
solution to the nuclear issue.84 In addition, a discussion on North Korea’s defensive power provides an 
important analysis on North Korea’s ability to resist US influence. This chapter ultimately seeks to 
illustrate the dangers of a nuclear North Korea and the need therefore to neutralize this situation. 
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An important lesson learned from the collapse of the Cold War and failure of socialism was that 
economic success; and not military strength, served as the most effective means of state survival.85 
North Korea however did not follow along this path. From the time of President Kim Il-Sung’s rule, North 
Korean efforts were continually directed at reinforcing and strengthening the countries military 
capabilities as a vital strategy of state survival. This policy was maintained under the rule of Kim Jong-Il, 
who upheld a war-like atmosphere since attaining leadership of North Korea.86 Despite signing on to the 
NPT in 1985, North Korea had always remained determined to develop a nuclear weapons program.87 
Between mid-1960-1970, North Korea’s nuclear interest mainly focused on studies regarding nuclear 
fuel refining, conversion and fabrication.88 In the 1980’s, North Korea then extended interest toward the 
practical uses of nuclear energy and the completion of a nuclear weapon development system and thus 
began constructing a 200 megawatt nuclear reactor and nuclear reprocessing facilities at Yongbyon and 
Taechon.89 In 1985, US officials presented intelligence of data proving that North Korea was building a 
secret nuclear reactor. This resulted in international pressure on North Korea who then signed on to the 
NPT in 1985 but refused however to sign a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA).90       
It is this situation that has led to various tensions and issues regarding North Korea’s nuclear aspirations. 
Between 1992-1993 for instance, the IAEA was permitted to, after North Korea’s eventual acceptance of 
the safeguard agreement, inspect six of North Korea’s seven declared nuclear facilities.91 In March 1993 
however, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT stating that the IAEA had violated the 
principle of ‘impartiality’ by involving the intelligence of the US in special inspections, unpermitted by 
North Korea, at the unreported Yongbyon nuclear site. This led North Korea, in 1994, to remove 8 000 
fuel rods from its 25 megawatt reactor, without permitting monitoring by IAEA inspectors.92 This 
situation caused a great amount of tension and instability as the US contemplated a military strike on 
North Korea’s nuclear facilities; while dispatching missiles and reinforcements to South Korea in 
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preparation for an imminent full scale conflict.93 This is just one example illustrative of North Korea’s 
nuclear developments that increased the possibility of full scale conflict within the region. Furthermore, 
tensions increased upon the discovery of plutonium in North Korean nuclear facilities. In 1994, the 
Department of Energy estimated that 8 kilograms of plutonium could be used for a small nuclear 
weapon. This raised concern internationally as US estimates reported North Korea to possess 12 
kilograms which could result in the formation of one or even two nuclear bombs.94 For these reasons 
therefore concern has always been raised regarding North Korea’s nuclear developments.   
2.1 The Reasons for North Korea’s Nuclear Developments. 
An important reason for North Korea’s nuclear developments is based on North Koreas concern with the 
US military threat.95 North Korea fears that the US is determined to overthrow its government after 
having brought down socialism in the former Soviet Union. North Korea therefore has adopted a policy 
that ensures a militarily and economically powerful state. An important strategy for North Korea then is 
to avoid transparency in missile and nuclear issues in order to build a military powerful state or simply 
creating the perception of North Korea as a military powerful state. North Korea thus continues to resist 
US demands for inspections unless it receives economic compensations that would then facilitate 
economic development. North Korea thus, in developing and maintaining a nuclear program to ensure 
state survival against the US threat, is able in addition to use their nuclear program as leverage to attain 
economic incentives that in addition to military developments, ensures state survival. This is what is 
referred to as North Korea’s defensive power against the US offensive power.96 North Koreas military 
insecurity and economic failure therefore have been key factors influencing North Korea’s nuclear 
development in order to maintain state sovereignty. These points are reaffirmed by the views of Bertil 
Lintner.97 In an interview with Mr. Lintner, the point was stressed that nuclear weapons are considered 
as North Koreas only ‘life insurance.’ Mr. Lintner reaffirmed this point by describing his trip to 
Pyongyang in 2004 whereupon questions were continually asked by top North Korean officials on his 
views regarding Bush’s plans to attack North Korea. Once again this reaffirms the North Korean fear and 
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insecurity of the US threat, as Mr. Lintner explains, the North Korean fear of not wanting to become 
“another Iraq.”98    
This leads to the importance of the Juche ideology within North Korean foreign policy. The Juche 
ideology stresses importance on the principles of independence and sovereignty and explains North 
Koreas key foreign policy objective therefore to prevent foreign intervention.99 North Korea is the only 
country that has adopted Juche as the ruling ideology and the policy thus provides North Korea the 
rationale to exert defensive power over the US, who they consider a threat to their sovereignty. As 
Chapter two aims to illustrate in the antagonistic polices pursued by both the Clinton and Bush 
Administration, that tensions were simply fueled as these antagonistic policies simply increased North 
Korean fears and insecurity causing them to retaliate with greater nuclear threats. Furthermore, 
negotiations on missile and nuclear issues coincide with the maintenance of the Kim regime, North 
Korean leadership therefore cannot simply give in to US demands or pressure. As the ‘realizer’ of Juche, 
Kim Jong-Il has to maintain nuclear developments to ensure state and regime survival.100 In this way 
then nuclear weapons are seen as the gold standard of the Kim family regime.101  
An example illustrative of North Korea’s fear of the US is evident in the events that precede US President 
Bush’s adoption of the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004.102 This Act ultimately infringed on the 
regimes rule over its citizens and thus impacted on North Korean sovereignty. North Korea thus 
responded by calling this a ‘declaration of war’ that left them with no option but to reinforce their 
nuclear deterrent.103 This then is a clear example of the manner in which North Korea responds to a US 
threat to its sovereignty. North Korea adopted a hostile reaction and threatened a nuclear response as 
resistance to this threat. The issue therefore around North Koreas nuclear developments is an issue of 
security.104 North Korea has always stated that it will negotiate a verifiable end to all nuclear weapons 
development if the US formally commits to respect North Korean sovereignty. In light of these 
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discussions on the reasons for and evidence of North Koreas nuclear aspirations; certain concerns are 
raised regarding the implications and dangers a nuclear North Korea presents. 
North Korea is often described as a rogue state. Many definitions find rogue states to be ruled by a 
group that control power through coercion, suppressing basic human rights and freedoms.105 These 
groups seek to maintain regime dominance and embark on costly military programs, particularly in 
weapons of mass destruction to protect and ensure regime survival against all threats. This definition 
however, that associates proliferation with undemocratic states ignores the fact that most nuclear 
armed countries are democratic. In addition, one cannot look to human rights abuses in authoritarian 
nations as grounds to classify countries as rogue nations as many democratic states themselves have 
records of human rights abuses.106  
Questions therefore arise as to why North Korea would be classified as a rogue state while countries like 
Syria, involved in purchasing weapons of mass destruction are omitted.107 The answer however remains 
clear. The US needs the assistance of Syria in resolving issues in the Middle East and this clearly shows a 
dominance of pragmatism over principle in determining which countries are classified as rogue 
nations.108 Furthermore, this represents the policy of the US aimed at political mobilization whereby the 
US would seek support for political action against an alleged threat that would then justify the pursuit of 
an aggressive and confrontational policy. In the case of the US policy on North Korea, particularly under 
the Bush administration, the US believed that the only way to end proliferation by North Korea was to 
achieve regime change, and therefore adopted an aggressive, hard-line policy of hawk engagement.109 
As discussed previously however, the only reason North Korea maintains a nuclear program is as a 
military deterrent against this US threat to its sovereignty and not as an offensive weapon. By adopting 
aggressive policies therefore that only fuel these North Korean fears and insecurities it is clearly evident 
why North Korea would respond with even greater nuclear threats as a deterrent to the US threat. 
Chapter two aims to further discuss this issue and proceeds to provide with recommendations on the 
need for engagement and negotiation to lessen North Korean fears and insecurities and thus lessen the 
chance that North Korea would respond with nuclear brinkmanship.       
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What is evident with regard to the US policy toward North Korea is the fact that the US always presents 
the ‘worst case scenario’ as an indisputable truth.110 In addition, the US, in most cases, distorts 
intelligence on North Korea and thereby seriously exaggerates the dangers of Pyongyang. This is most 
evident in the US reports of the dangers of North Korean uranium nuclear developments. This example 
furthermore illustrates the manner in which the US raised the Uranium issue as a ploy to scare both 
Japan and South Korea who up until that point both adopted a conciliatory approach to North Korea.111 
At the time, US intelligence presented clear findings that North Korea did not have the capacity to build 
a uranium nuclear weapon as North Korea still faced many obstacles in pursuing an enrichment 
program.112 Furthermore, the US did not publicly release any of the intelligence on North Korea’s 
uranium program and it thus became clear that the US chose to exploit this issue mainly for political 
purposes.113 As is clearly evident in the words of General James Clapper, Director of Defense Intelligence 
Agency in 1994, “We didn’t have smoking gun evidence either way. But you build a case for a range of 
possibilities. In a case like North Korea, you have to apply the most conservative approach, the worst 
case scenario”.114 This is clear evidence of the approach adopted by the US in dealing with the North 
Korean proliferation issue. An approach that resulted in the US making accusations without any 
evidence that only further represented their aggressive policy that only fueled tensions further.         
Despite this argument however that explains the many exaggerations that are made regarding the North 
Korean nuclear threat, the threat of North Korea remains a reality where important aspects and 
developments need to be considered.  
 
2.2 Dangers and Implications of a Nuclear North Korea.     
North Korea is a state whose leadership believes that state and regime survival against any threat lies 
mainly in the development of nuclear weapons.115 The possibility then of the North Korean leadership 
giving up on nuclear developments while seeking to protect sovereignty and ensure regime survival is 
greatly weakened. Furthermore, concerns only increase when looking to the distinctive nature of the 
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North Korean situation. North Korea is not described or considered a ‘rational adversary’.116 Russia for 
instance, during the Cuban missile crisis was considered a rational adversary with which the US was able 
to deal with. In addition, North Korea is not considered a ‘rag-tag’ Third World regime compared to that 
of Afghanistan or Libya, North Korea on the other hand is seen as the world’s most intransigent and 
unyielding totalitarian regimes. As such, North Korea is seen as a state that has little to gain from 
peaceful coexistence and little to lose from confrontation and thus, in light of this, places a great value 
on nuclear weaponry.117 This is what makes the North Korean situation dangerous as this is a country 
accustomed to subsistence whose main goal is state survival based on nuclear acquisition against all 
threats. Kim Jong-Il has thus continually confessed North Koreas nuclear capability prompted by his own 
concerns for security.118 Under the rule of Kim Jong-Il, North Korea has engaged in coercive bargaining 
that has often resulted in crisis as North Korea continually provokes tension by firing missiles and 
walking away from treaties.119 Such an adversary therefore becomes a dangerous threat as the very 
issue of nuclear development that raises concern is the same factor North Korea depends on for state 
survival.  
It is important to note in addition that traditional power politics cannot be applied to the North Korean 
situation. Traditional power politics is characterized by impositions that are made by stronger nations 
onto weaker nations.120 North Korea however, is representive of a paradoxical phenomenon known as 
the ‘power of the weak’.121 In the North Korean case, North Korea’s policy of brinkmanship based on its 
nuclear program is able to exercise substantial influence and lead a greater power against its will. As 
North Korean stakes in nuclear issues are directly linked to its own state survival, North Korea will 
continue to use nuclear threats as an important tool to counter any threat to its sovereignty.122 
Traditional power politics are non-existent therefore as the US does not have the power to use its 
military strength in this case to exert any impositions or obligations upon North Korea. This would 
explain the reasons why North Korea is seen as a state that has little to gain from peaceful coexistence 
and little to lose from confrontation and thus, in light of this, places a great value on nuclear 
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weaponry.123 Chapter two will therefore discuss the reasons why an aggressive and hard-line US policy is 
not effective in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue as it simply encourages North Korean 
nuclear brinkmanship to ensure regime survival. North Korea will continue to use nuclear threats as a 
defensive tool against the US offensive policy124, instead of surrender to the military strength of the US 
as advocated under the concept of traditional power politics.       
Another concern raised points to the lack of transparency, knowledge and information regarding North 
Korea’s nuclear development that only fuels suspicion and raises tensions. Furthermore, a serious 
problem arises as most news of North Korea is often the product of American analysis, the news 
therefore is mainly a projection of Americans with a strong view on how they thought North Korea 
would react.125 News then was based mainly on assumption that only leads to a great deal of 
misinterpretation that could simply fuel tensions further. This ultimately makes the situation even more 
difficult to resolve as the international community is unaware of exactly what it is dealing with and what 
needs to be done. The issue of the level of plutonium in North Korea for instance, is a serious concern. 
The plutonium issue continues to raise anxiety as enough plutonium allows for the creation of a nuclear 
weapon; and it has not yet been determined how much plutonium North Korea has.126 The international 
community is thus left to speculate on whether or not North Korea has, or will be, in the near future, 
able to create nuclear weapons. As it stands, estimates show North Korea to possess enough plutonium 
for up to eight nuclear weapons, four times what it had three years ago.127 This uncertainty only raises 
suspicion that creates and maintains an atmosphere of tension. The international community will thus 
continue to fear the worst from North Korea and will thereby maintain an environment of suspicion, 
tension and hostility. Another example of this in seen in North Korea’s ambiguous Statement in 2002 
about possessing weapons more powerful than nuclear weapons. 128 Due to a lack of evidence, 
information and knowledge; experts are simply left to assume and suspect that North Korea possesses 
                                                          
123
 House, K. “The Lesson of North Korea,” Wall Street Journal, 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110002857, January 3 2003. 
124
 Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea’s Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations,” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 
4, Winter 2000-2001, p. 542. 
125
 Bala, A and Solomon, H. Between Nukes and Negotiations: Exploring the North Korean Crisis. SAIIA Reports, 
South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa, 2005, p. 24. 
126
 Ibid, p. 15. 
127
 O’Hanlon, M., “The North Korean Nuclear Threat”, in The Chronicle of Higher Education, Vol. 51, Iss. 30, April 
2005. 
128
 Sharma, V. “State Sponsors: North Korea,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9364/, 
28 June 2008. 
27 | P a g e  
 
biological and chemical weapons and this only raises more suspicion and tension regarding the danger 
of North Korea.129   
Further concern is raised regarding the series of developments of North Koreas nuclear program. The 
announcement of the alleged Taepodong I for instance, show a more advanced missile program.130 
North Korean missiles, created in 1976 for instance, only had a range of 60-106 km, but developed into 
Nodong and Taepodong missiles that now have a range of up to 6 700 km.131 The Taepodong II again 
represented North Korea’s continued advancement in nuclear capability as this missile has the potential 
of reaching the US mainland while Taepodong I can reach South Korea and Japan.  Not only did these 
developments result in a stalemate between North Korea and the US that only increased the already 
tense relationship; but it advanced the potential of a major security crisis in the region. South Korea for 
instance began talks with the US to develop long-range missiles and thus extend its missile range while 
Japan approved the US-Japan defence cooperation guidelines in the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) 
system with the US.132 The TMD system raises many concerns and fears within East Asia that TMD 
deployments could trigger a regional arms race and would thus greatly foster regional instability.133 
These developments therefore only increased the possibility of an arms race in East Asia that would 
increase an already hostile situation.  
In addition, concern was raised regarding the sale of nuclear devices from North Korea to other 
nations.134 Given the economic value of missile and nuclear weapons, it is easy to see why North Korea 
would not give up on these sales that prove indispensible for economic survival.135 According to US 
reports, North Korea has become the largest missile exporter, earning approximately $ 580 million 
between 1980-1992.136 An estimated forty percent of North Korea’s foreign exchange earnings are from 
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weapon sales, mainly through missile exports.137 Reports show North Korean sales of ballistic missile 
technology to Iran and Syria while missile technology has been transferred to Pakistan and Yemen.138 
These sales only increase tensions around issues on proliferation. The sale of the Nodong I medium-
range ballistic missile to Iran for instance has a range of 1350-1500 km and a payload of 1 200 kilograms 
of explosives that can theoretically hit Israel.139 Another major concern is that these sales will be to 
other rouge nations mainly in the Middle East and Asia and increases the chance therefore that missiles 
and advanced nuclear devices could end up in the possession of international terrorist groups. 
Furthermore, an increase in sales only allows for greater development of North Korea’s own nuclear 
program. North Korean nuclear sales to Egypt for instance have played an important role in North 
Korea’s missile development.140 Where North Korea could only develop missiles with a range of 60-160 
km in the 1970’s, can today produce missiles that have the potential to strike as far as the US mainland. 
These developments therefore, linked to the increasing sales of nuclear weapons raises a great amount 
of concern as North Korea’s nuclear proliferation continues to advance. 
Concern furthermore is raised regarding the implications and impact a nuclear North Korea has toward 
the international security regime of the NPT. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 after the Bush 
Administration charged North Korea for undertaking a second uranium-based nuclear program.141 What 
is significant to note is that North Korea withdrew from the NPT without having suffered any meaningful 
sanctions.142 North Korea’s success in avoiding meaningful repercussions sets a negative example for 
other nations and thereby erodes future arms control and proliferation compliance.143 This is a 
dangerous prospect as other nations could learn from North Korea and not abide by proposals set by the 
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NPT. Another concern is raised in addition as the erosion of the NPT begins to serve as a medium 
through which Korean peninsula developments drive other proliferation dangers, Iranian ambitions for 
instance.144 There are various arguments moreover stating that the NPT is now under pressure as a 
result of North Korean non-compliance and withdrawal making the stakes therefore in keeping the NPT 
viable very high.145  
In light of these discussions therefore, the dangers and implications of a nuclear North Korea are clear. 
Not only does North Korea continue advancing its own nuclear program; but it continues to sell devices 
and technology to other nations that only increases proliferation dangers and increases the possibility of 
threats to peace and stability within various unstable regions.  
 
2.3 North Koreas policy of Brinkmanship. 
Brinkmanship, the most distinctive characteristic of North Korean diplomacy, is a unilateral policy that 
involves making unconditional demands, bluffing, threatening and stalling which all result in a mixture of 
provocative and aggressive tactics.146 This tactic is clearly evident in the words of a North Korean 
negotiator stating, “If you don’t accept our proposal, we will walk out,” and “We accept your proposal, 
but you do X first.”147 Furthermore, there are no limits to North Korean brinkmanship that sees North 
Korea threatening war if certain demands are not met or policies, such as the imposition of sanctions, 
are not accepted.148 North Korea for instance has continually threatened the use of nuclear conflict after 
sanctions have been imposed or certain demands were not met. In July 2000 for example, North Korea 
threatened to restart its nuclear program if the US did not compensate for delays in building civilian 
nuclear power plants. 149 In a more recent incident, in response to UN condemnation for a North Korean 
                                                          
144
 Huntley, W.L., “U.S. Policy Toward North Korea In Strategic Context: Tempting Goliaths Fate”, in Asian 
Survey, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2007 
145
 Alan, Q., “North Korean Brinkmanship and its Global Impact,” in Mainstream, Vol. 47 , No. 25, June 2009, 
http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1419.html. 
146
 Snyder, S. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. United States Institute of Peace Press, 
Washington, 1999, p. 76. 
147
 Snyder, S. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. United States Institute of Peace Press, 




 “Timeline: North Koreas Nuclear Development,” The Associated Press, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/world/asia/10chronocnd.html?_r=1, 9 October 2006. 
30 | P a g e  
 
Rocket launch, North Korea launched a multistage rocket. 150 These examples clearly represent a 
situation that only increases tensions and instability in an already hostile situation.  
Furthermore, this policy is counterproductive as it undermines the development of an effective working 
relationship between negotiators.151 In this sense, North Korea would not be seen as a rational 
negotiator as it continues to threaten and bluff and even walk away from talks if conditions are not 
suitable. Mr. Lintners views again reaffirm these views regarding North Korean brinkmanship. According 
to Mr. Lintner, North Korea has discovered that its nuclear policy acts as an important diplomatic tool 
which they can use to extract concessions and aid from South Korea, Japan and the US.152 This is often 
referred to as ‘nuclear blackmail’ as each time that North Korean demands are not met, a nuclear test or 
any such provocative act will be carried out, after which North Korea usually attains the desired 
concession.153  Chapter Two will however provide with reasons as to why North Korean brinkmanship 
continues and ways in which this can be avoided if the US adopts polices of negotiation and engagement 
that will lessen North Korean insecurities that remains the main cause of North Korean brinkmanship. A 
further danger arises as this policy could cause negotiators to discount the real sources of tension as 
they could miscalculate a threat, seeing it as a bluff instead and therefore risk possible escalations of the 
conflict.154  
Linked closely to this policy is the policy of crisis diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy is a process that involves 
a manipulation of threats.155 For instance, when the US ignored Pyongyangs call for the replacement of 
reactors in 1992, Pyongyang responded by threatening to withdraw from the NPT and defect from all 
inspections.156 This leads to the ideology regarding the ‘power of the weak,’ whereby weaker powers are 
able to exert substantial influence in the international system and manipulate and lead the greater 
power away from its own desired position.157 The traditional power approach therefore remains 
inadequate in accounting for North Korea’s role and influence over other states, the US particularly.158 
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The US for instance was unable to impose sanctions on North Korea following North Korea’s threat in 
1993 and thus had to resort to negotiations instead where North Korea attained its long-standing 
objective of establishing a direct relationship with the US.159 North Korea’s threat to withdraw from the 
NPT illustrated the leverage North Korea had by using the potential threat of its nuclear program. The 
result of this threat saw the formation of negotiations based on North Korean terms.160 This policy of 
political blackmail has the danger of creating even more hostility between the two as North Korea does 
not conform to US interests and in addition; continues to exercise its defensive power against the US.161 
This situation therefore only fuels an already unstable and hostile situation in which the creation of a 
constructive negotiating environment is compromised.  
The North Korean nuclear threat thus raises many points of concern. As North Korean nuclear sales 
increase, the advancement and development of North Korea’s nuclear programme continues. 
Furthermore, growing North Korean nuclear proliferation fuels proliferation ambitions, not only within 
East Asia, but in many other unstable regions in addition. North Korean withdrawal from the NPT in 
addition is said to provide motivation for other states to continue, unhindered, in acquiring nuclear 
weapons.162 In addition, attempting to bring North Korea back to the NPT without absolving past non-
compliance would also present the chance for other NPT parties to break certain rules.163 For these 
reasons therefore, North Korean nuclear activities clearly present a threat and challenge to international 
peace and security. The lack of transparency, information and knowledge regarding North Korean 
nuclear developments only increases suspicion as the international community is left to speculation and 
assumption that only fuels uncertainty and thereby raises tension and hostility. This situation is then 
compounded by the adoption of policies of brinkmanship by North Korea that again does not allow for a 
conducive and productive environment to promote constructive negotiation. In light of these 
discussions therefore, the dangers and implications of a nuclear North Korea are clear. The need 
therefore to neutralize this threat is essential in preserving and maintaining global standards of peace 
and stability. This chapter has explained and illustrated the key reason for North Korean nuclear 
development as a defensive deterrent based on their insecurity against the US aggressive policy aimed 
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at regime change in Pyongyang. This insecurity leads North Korea to pursue a policy of brinkmanship 
and coercive bargaining, by maintaining a nuclear program. Chapter two will therefore proceed to 
discuss the failure of the Bush Administration in neutralizing the North Korean nuclear threat by 
adopting an aggressive hard-line policy of hawk engagement that simply maintained and increased 
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Chapter Three 
3. The Bush Administrations North Korean Policy 
“I view the North Korean situation as one that can be resolved peacefully” (President George W. Bush, 
December 31, 2002)165 
The study will now proceed with an in depth analysis and critique of the Bush Administrations North 
Korean policy, determining whether it neutralized or simply aggravated the North Korean nuclear 
situation. The above quotation, stated by President Bush upon his election, gives the impression of a US 
policy that aims to negotiate, cooperate and engage with North Korea in a peaceful manner. This 
chapter will however illustrate an aggressive, hostile and hard-line policy of hawk engagement instead, 
adopted by the Bush Administration, which only fueled tensions further as it intensified North Korean 
insecurities. 
 The chapter will begin with an analysis of the Clinton Administrations North Korean policy. This analysis 
will provide with a background and context of US-North Korean relations prior to the arrival of the Bush 
Administration. This analysis aims to illustrate the positive policies of engagement adopted by the 
Clinton Administration that allowed for and facilitated an improvement in US-North Korean relations 
and the containment of the North Korean nuclear threat. The engagement policies adopted by the 
Clinton Administration culminated into the Agreed Framework that promised further improvements in 
US-North Korean relations and showed clear signs of improved North Korean behavior, away from 
aggressive policies of brinkmanship. 
The Bush Administration however, did not advance and further these policies of engagement. This 
chapter will provide a discussion on the reasons for a more aggressive and hard-line policy of hawk 
engagement as pursued by the Bush Administration. The study will proceed to analyze the implications 
of this more aggressive, and often hostile, policy.          
3.1 The Clinton Administration and North Korea: The 1993 Nuclear Crisis. 
A major criticism against American foreign policy regards the United States (US) unwillingness to 
cooperate with rivals including the tendency of making promises they do not uphold.166 It is suggested 
that countries that seek nuclear arms are insecure; adopting policies that isolate and antagonize these 
                                                          
165
 “George W. Bush: Exchange with Reporters in Crawford, Texas,” The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=263. December 31, 2002. 
166
 Sigal, L. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 
1998, p. 3. 
35 | P a g e  
 
countries therefore is counterproductive.167 What is needed then instead is a policy of ‘diplomatic give-
and-take’ that combines reassurance with conditional reciprocity.168 Such a policy will promise 
inducements on the condition that potential proliferators accept nuclear restraints that will then 
increase the chance of non-proliferation169. The US foreign policy toward North Korea is a case in point 
that is representive of this criticism.  
The Clinton Administration’s policy toward North Korea was initially based on misjudgments that were 
mainly political.170 In addressing the North Korean issue, Clinton therefore adopted a posture, and not a 
policy by adopting a tough stance toward North Korea that allowed for and led to the crisis faced in 
1993. When dealing with the North Korean plutonium issue for instance, the Clinton Administration 
threatened to employ economic sanctions, a policy choice that would only further antagonize North 
Korea and further fuel North Korean insecurities. The Administration therefore opted for coercive 
diplomacy, a strategy to compel North Korean compliance to the NPT by threatening economic 
sanctions. In 1993, the US had accused the North Koreans of conducting a nuclear weapons program 
where it was alleged that enough plutonium had been extracted for one or two nuclear weapons.171 
Tensions escalated further with the dispute and disagreement over the IAEA inspection of the 
unreported Yongbyon facility.172 The crisis came to a boiling point when the US had threatened 
sanctions against North Korea through the United Nations Security Council, seen as an ‘an act of war’ by 
the North Koreans who then resorted to the policy of brinkmanship and threatened withdrawal from 
the NPT.173 The region was thus placed on the brink of war. This example therefore clearly illustrates the 
Clinton Administrations hard-line approach in dealing with North Korea. Instead of the Clinton 
Administration considering resolving the crisis through direct talks with North Korea, focus was placed 
instead on whether or not China would support the sanctions.174 This policy therefore simply 
antagonized the North Koreans who responded typically by adopting a defensive policy of brinkmanship 
to counter the US offensive policy.   
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The situation was resolved however with the visit of former President Jimmy Carter to Pyongyang. Cater 
received Kim Jong-Il’s pledge to freeze the nuclear program in return for US assistance on North Korea’s 
energy program and a reduction of tensions between both countries.175 This offer was accepted by the 
Clinton Administration who then chose to negotiate with North Korea that led to the formulation of the 
Agreed Framework in 1994.176 The Clinton Administration therefore chose to adopt the policy of 
‘diplomatic give-and-take’ by promising financial and technical assistance for the North Korean energy 
program while North Korea promised to freeze nuclear developments. The US agreed to provide North 
Korea with two Light Water Nuclear Reactors (LWRs) for electricity generation while North Korea agreed 
to abandon nuclear research reactors and comply with nuclear safeguards.177 This informed the new 
policy adopted by the Clinton Administration stating that, “it is always possible to get an agreement 
when you give enough away.”178  In keeping with this new policy, the Clinton Administration agreed to 
lift the previous policy to impose sanctions and continued diplomatic meetings.179 These diplomatic 
meetings would assist in the policy objective to achieve a full normalization of political and economic 
relations between the US and North Korea. Furthermore, leading from the Agreed Framework was the 
establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO.180 KEDO, established 
by The Republic of Korea, the US and Japan, was obligated to supply North Korea with heavy fuel oil to 
ensure fuel electricity generation while the LWRs were under construction.181  
The initial policy of the Clinton Administration therefore, that adopted for a policy of coercive 
diplomacy, brought the region to the brink of war.182 This policy ultimately discouraged cooperation and 
opted instead for a ‘crime-and-punishment’ approach, opting for sanctions over negotiation in dealing 
with a ‘rogue’ state. The US represented their inability to recognize the fact that North Korea adopted a 
nuclear program in light of insecurities and in an attempt to adopt ‘tit-for-tat’ nuclear diplomacy. As 
discussed in chapter one, North Korea adopts a nuclear program to ensure state and regime survival 
against the antagonistic US threat that can only be secured by economic strength; and thus the need to 
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keep a nuclear program that provides the leverage to achieve various incentives. Countless examples 
represent situations in which North Korea becomes more unruly in response to an aggressive US policy 
but in contrast; responds with more concessions when dealing with a more cooperative US attitude. The 
Clinton Administrations switch to ‘give-and-take’ diplomacy is a key example representing a decrease in 
tensions as a more cooperative environment brought North Korea to offer more concessions.183  
The Clinton Administration thus turned to a policy of engagement despite condemnations from hard-
liners that engagement would amount to appeasement that would simply encourage North Korean 
threat and wayward, deviant behavior.184 The Clinton Administration realized however that the opposite 
was in fact true. The Administration recognised that well placed concessions can essentially have a 
controlling effect on a country that needs the cooperation and assistance of the outside world.185 The 
Administration became aware that North Korea responds in a more cooperative manner if the US 
engages in a non-aggressive manner, as was clearly illustrated by former President Jimmy Carter. This 
new policy furthermore, was in line with the ‘sunshine policy’ pursued by South Korea and this greatly 
facilitated improved relations between the US, South Korea and North Korea. Improved relations were 
evident in the landmark first inter-Korean summit meeting in June 2000.186 By adopting a strategy that 
was now consistent to that of its important South Korean ally, the Clinton Administration was able to 
change the antagonistic US view of North Korea as a rogue state that is irrational and incapable of 
compromise.187 This change in policy and attitude led to and facilitated a great amount of progress in 
US-Korean relations and allowed for various breakthroughs. Inter-Korean relations improved greatly 
while North Korea adopted a policy of “New Thinking”.188 This policy of “New Thinking” for instance, was 
aimed at economic recovery and restructuring that demonstrated the DPRK’s new willingness to learn 
from the outside world, instead of remaining completely isolated and closed off.189 In 2001, for instance, 
North Korea sent almost 500 students and government officials abroad, to mostly other Asian countries, 
to study economics, business and technical subjects.190 
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 The US policy toward North Korea therefore of engagement pursued by the Clinton Administration saw 
a policy shift that brought notable success in improving US-North Korean relations in addition to 
neutralizing North Korean nuclear threats. This success and progress in the normalization of US-North 
Korean relations and the containment of the North Korean nuclear threat however was compromised 
upon the election of the Bush Administration when a shift in policy saw engagement replaced by a hard-
line policy of hawk engagement.   
3.2 The Bush Administration and North Korea 
The US policy toward North Korea upon the election of the Bush Administration saw a reversal from 
engagement to a hard-line, hawkish approach often described as being deliberately provocative.191 This 
policy had the sole objective of achieving regime change in Pyongyang and therefore adopted a strategy 
of hawk engagement to build support for action to be taken against North Korea to accelerate the 
collapse of the Kim regime. This Administration began by setting conditions for cooperation that it knew 
were unacceptable to Pyongyang and then used this to justify US views of North Korea as an 
unreasonable rogue state.192 The antagonistic US view of North Korea as an irrational rogue nation 
therefore returned with the Bush Administrations more hard-line aggressive policy. This showed early 
signs of the potential tension and strain this policy would have in not fostering and furthering 
engagement policies established under the Clinton Administration.  
What is notable from the inception of the Bush Administration is the divergent and contradictory policy 
choice toward North Korea resulting from a split in views between two camps in the Bush 
Administration. While one camp called for a hard-line aggressive policy for North Korea, the other opted 
for more engagement and negotiation.193 In the end however, an aggressive hawkish policy dominated 
over engagement and cooperation. For instance, while the US in 2001, adopted a comprehensive policy 
recommending unconditional talks with Pyongyang, a more aggressive policy was chosen instead when 
Bush, in his State of the Union Address in 2002, grouped North Korea with Iran and Iraq as part of the 
‘axis of evil’.194 This represents a clear reversal from the Clinton Administration that immediately caused 
a great amount of tension and disrupted all previous improvements achieved by the Clinton 
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Administration. North Korea responded by viewing the speech as a “little short of declaring war on the 
DPRK”.195 North Korea had taken various steps to distance itself from terrorism and it therefore became 
clear that by linking North Korea to terrorism, President Bush guaranteed a hostile response from 
Pyongyang, after which it could then justify the need for a hard-line aggressive policy to deals with a 
hostile North Korea.196  
Not only did Bush divert from the policy of engagement established by the Clinton Administration, but 
Bush went on in addition, in 2001 to criticize South Korea’s ‘sunshine policy’.197 This greatly strained an 
improved and strengthened US-South Korean alliance. The failed summit meeting in 2001 between the 
US and South Korea is representive of this point.198 This summit clearly highlighted the divisions within 
the Bush Administration and between the US and South Korea regarding the policy of engagement with 
North Korea.199 This lack of consistency in policy objectives between the US and South Korea strains an 
alliance that is unable then to effectively deal with the North Korean situation in a unified manner. The 
Clinton Administration adopted a policy of engagement the worked consistently with South Koreas 
‘sunshine policy’ facilitating an improved US-South Korean alliance, and an improved inter-Korean 
alliance. The Bush Administration however, shifted to adopt a more aggressive hard-line policy that only 
strained US-South Korean relations whereby South Korea constantly opposed US efforts to place 
sanctions on North Korea or even discuss the use of force.200 Agreement between these two allies is 
crucial in effectively dealing with North Korea. Strain and inconsistency in the US-South Korean 
relationship can be seen upon the passing of the Human Rights Act by President Bush in September 
2004.201 This Act directly attacked the DPRK as a dictatorship by calling for the promotion of freedom 
and human rights. South Korea responded by criticizing the Act for increasing tension and friction 
between the US and North Korea. Instead of working together therefore, South Korea and the US 
pursued different methods in dealing with North Korea that prevented a unified alliance. Furthermore, 
unlike the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration failed to promote and maintain a healthy 
relationship between North and South Korea. The Bush Administration failed to recognize the need to 
maintain a relationship between the two that had been moving away from confrontation toward a 
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policy of engagement pursued by South Korea and supported by the Clinton Administration.202 The Bush 
Administration therefore, in light of its firm deterrence policy, needed to retain flexibility that would 
continue to improve inter-Korean relations and thereby enhance stability on the peninsula.203 The Bush 
Administrations hard-line policy of hawk engagement however, did not provide support for the South 
Korean policy of engagement and went on therefore to strain both US-North Korean and inter-Korean 
relations that did not enhance or work toward stability on the peninsula.  
 Divergent interests were again evident within KEDO, where South Korea urged the US to adopt a more 
pacifying and softer stance toward North Korea.204 South Korea went on to assert that closer US-North 
Korean relations based on policies of engagement would improve South Koreas relations with 
Pyongyang.205 It can therefore be concluded, that a more aggressive and hostile US policy pursued by 
the Bush Administration, not only affected US-North Korean relations, but impacted negatively on South 
Korea’s relations with Pyongyang in addition. Where engagement policies of the Clinton Administration 
fostered a more cooperative environment between the US, South and North Korea; the aggressive 
policy of the Bush Administration went on to disrupt and strain relations between all parties. 
Furthermore, given the deep interest of the US’s key allies in the Korean peninsula, it was vital and 
necessary for the US to have a unified policy that had the agreement of all parties involved.206 The Bush 
Administration’s confrontational policy however met with resistance from China, South Korea and even 
Japan.207  
3.1.1 The Bush Administrations Policy of Hawk Engagement       
Hawk engagement as pursued by the Bush Administration, held the belief that engagement laid the 
groundwork needed for punitive action.208 This is a policy best understood when contrasted against the 
‘sunshine policy’ of South Korea. South Korea recognized the fact that North Korean strategies of 
brinkmanship, that formulated their threatening posture, are based mainly on their insecurity. As such, 
South Korea chose to adopt a policy of engagement to create an environment that would facilitate 
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conciliatory negotiation to lessen North Korean insecurity and in this way prevent North Korea from 
pursuing a nuclear program thereby lessening the nuclear threat. Various ‘carrots’ or incentives that 
included economic aid and normalized relations were used to help reduce the tension and give North 
Korea a stake in the status quo; this would then have a greater influence in getting North Korea to 
cooperate in negotiations in which it now has something to gain or lose.209 This policy was pursued by 
the Clinton Administration, represented in the Agreed Framework of 1994, and brought a great amount 
of improvement in containing the North Korean proliferation threat. The Agreed Framework opened up 
a path to peace and normal relations between the US and North Korea in addition to improving inter-
Korean relations.210 Progress however was hampered upon the election of the Bush Administration that 
reversed these policies of engagement.    
The Bush Administrations hard-line policy of hawk engagement, breaks with these polices of 
engagement in various ways. The Bush Administrations policy of hawk engagement sought to use 
engagement initially to build a coalition of punishment at a later stage.211 The US would therefore turn 
todays ‘carrots’ into effective ‘sticks’ tomorrow in achieving its ultimate purpose of regime change in 
Pyongyang or simply to be in a better position to wield effective control over North Korea.212 It is 
important to note however, that the Bush Administration did not proceed with the engagement policy 
of the Clinton Administration; as such, the Bush Administration did not use the ‘carrots’ set up by the 
Clinton Administration to be able then to turn them into effective ‘sticks’ later on. The Bush 
Administration immediately began with an aggressive policy by refusing to provide ‘carrots’ or 
incentives unless North Korea met certain demands. This showed early signs therefore of a US policy 
moving away from engagement and ultimately a policy with no objective in continuing with the Agreed 
Framework.213 
 Engagement with the US itself was seen as an incentive as the US stipulated that any agreement would 
have to address issues regarding North Korea’s dismantlement of its nuclear programme, compliance 
with the IAEA and addressing human rights concerns.214 North Korea was thus presented with a ‘take-it-
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or-leave-it’ negotiating position that clearly represented an uncompromising and inflexible policy.215 
Donald Gregg, a senior US diplomat who served as the CIA Station Chief in Seoul, makes an important 
point stating that, “Significant progress with North Korea will only be achieved through sustained talk 
and negotiation. Sporadic meetings with inflexible demands and agendas will not do the job”.216 It is 
evident therefore, that this uncompromising and inflexible policy of the Bush Administration would not 
be effective in dealing with North Korea.  In addition, by adopting an uncompromising and inflexible 
policy, the Bush Administration made it clear that talks and engagement would only effectively occur if 
North Korea accepted these conditions. This policy then, from the beginning did not establish a 
productive environment to maintain the progressive engagement policy of the Clinton Administration. 
The Bush Administration was in a better position than Clinton to use the rationale of hawk engagement 
to turn the ‘carrots’ into ‘sticks’ and thereby wield control and influence of North Korean proliferation 
developments.217 The success of Clinton’s policy of engagement was based on a policy that provided 
North Korea with new benefits (food, energy and hard currency).218 The Bush Administration was in a 
prime position then to continue this policy, by continuing to raise the stakes for North Korea with these 
incentives and then threaten to withdraw these if North Korea did not comply with any agreement as 
set forth in the Agreed Framework.219 The Bush Administration however did not continue with the 
Clinton Administrations policy of engagement and could therefore not adopt this strategy that could 
provide the US with substantial influence over North Korea. The Bush Administration instead, began 
with an aggressive and hostile policy that only drove North Korea back to policies of brinkmanship.   
 The Bush Administration then did not continue the Clinton Administrations policy of engagement under 
the Agreed Framework or offer the incentives promised under this framework, but instead, immediately 
pursued an aggressive and uncompromising policy. This prevented the Administration therefore from 
pursuing engagement that would turn todays ‘carrots’ into effective ‘sticks’ for tomorrow as they did 
not provide any incentives to give the North Koreans a stake in the status quo. In this way then, the Bush 
Administrations aggressive policy would not successfully end the North Korean nuclear threat as it 
pursued a policy that was purely aggressive, and as such, simply encouraged the North Koreans to revert 
back to policies of brinkmanship, in which North Koreas main stake remained in their nuclear program 
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as a defensive deterrent against the aggressive policy of the Bush Administration.220 A key example 
representive of this argument can be seen in the crisis that resulted in 2003. 
The second nuclear crisis emerged in 2002 when North Korea admitted to a secret uranium enrichment 
program.221  In addition, North Korea announced that it would restart its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.222 
North Korea withdrew from the NPT, expelled IAEA inspectors and unsealed 8 000 plutonium rods upon 
announcing that it would restart the processing of spent fuels.223 This resulted in a crisis as dangerous as 
the crisis that emerged in 1993.224 This crisis however, cannot simply be a result of the actions of North 
Korea. The 2003 crisis, like the crisis of 1993 resulted from a sustained interaction of threat perceptions 
of the US aggressive policy and North Korean actions and reactions to these perceptions.225 In his State 
of the Union Address in 2002, Bush grouped North Korea, Iran and Iraq as part of an ‘axis of evil’ that 
signaled a sudden turnaround in US policy that showed anything but a US objective to normalize 
relations with Pyongyang.226 This address by Bush marked the beginning of a more aggressive US policy 
toward North Korea away from a conciliatory policy of engagement pursued by the Clinton 
Administration that sought economic and political normalization of US-North Korean relations.227 In 
addition, details of a Nuclear Posture review that stated the possibility of pre-emptive nuclear strikes 
against rogue nations, in which North Korea was included, became public in June 2002.228 Criticism thus 
surrounded the North Korean policy of the Bush Administration. The argument questioned the logic of 
Hawk engagement that sought for negotiations on peace while preparing for war; adopting a policy 
therefore that outlines the possibility of nuclear strikes is greatly at odds with a policy of engagement 
with North Korea.229  It is not surprising therefore to note the reaction of North Korea to this new 
aggressive US policy that simply fueled North Korean insecurities and fears. For the Bush Administration, 
expelling the Kim regime before it could further build its nuclear deterrent was the greatest and most 
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urgent priority.230 By adopting an aggressive and hostile policy to advance this priority however, simply 
fueled the North Korean threat as it only increased North Korean fears and insecurities.   
 Prior to this crisis, many commentators have stated that North Korea complied in many ways to the 
terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework, a view confirmed by both KEDO and CIA Director George Tenet 
who went as far as providing testimony to Congress in March 2002.231 President Bush’s State of the 
Union Address in 2002 in line with his public disagreement of the ‘sunshine policy’ in 2001, showed clear 
signs of a more aggressive and hostile US policy that did not embrace the existing policies of 
engagement232 that would ultimately generate fears and counter-reactions by North Korea.233 This then 
is what led to the crisis in 2003. North Korea’s anxiety and fear began to increase following President 
Bush’s axis of evil speech that led an official North Korean spokesperson to state that, “(North Korea) 
would respond …by starting its nuclear program and resuming its missile tests”234, and this is precisely 
what happened eight months later. North Koreas response paralleled its behavior during the 2003 crisis 
by adopting a policy of brinkmanship to get the hard-line US Administration to negotiate.235 This 
example illustrates once more that North Korean anxieties and insecurities against a US aggressive 
policy only fuels polices of brinkmanship; and simply maintains the North Korean motive to pursue 
nuclear development to reinforce brinkmanship and ensure a defensive deterrent. 
One needs to consider in addition the resemblance this more aggressive policy of hawk engagement has 
with North Korea’s policy of brinkmanship.236 The study has thus far illustrated an inflexible and 
uncompromising policy adopted by the Bush Administration that explicitly threatens North Korea while 
advancing policies that intentionally create a crisis in order to achieve concessions.237 For this reason, 
productive engagement and negotiation did not occur between the US and North Korea following the 
election of the Bush Administration.  A key example representive of this point again would be the events 
that led up to the 2003 crisis. In October 2002, a high level US envoy was sent to North Korea led by 
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Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly.238 Kelly ultimately brought an ultimatum to North Korea and 
not a message of reconciliation as expected by North Korea following the US call for ‘unconditional talks’ 
in 2001.239 Instead of negotiation, Kelly immediately began with accusations against North Korea of a 
secret program of enriching uranium for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons.240  Following this 
accusation, the US stated that North Korea had therefore violated the 1994 Agreed Framework and then 
went on to suspend oil shipments to North Korea that marked the end of the Agreed Framework.241 
North Korea retaliated by stating that the Bush Administrations aggressive policy, following the ‘axis of 
evil’ speech and the adoption of the Nuclear Posture Review; directly contravened  Article three of the 
Framework that called for US assurance to the DPRK  against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.242 
What is important to note is that the US had been suspecting secret uranium projects since the late 
1990’s, it therefore seemed that the Bush Administration had timed this visit to suit their objective of 
ending the Agreed Framework.243 The Bush Administration therefore clearly used this hostile strategy of 
accusation to end the 1994 Agreement that facilitated engagement and provided North Korea with 
incentives that Bush was against. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration aimed to stop 
KEDO from transferring the LWRs to North Korea as this nation, as part of the ‘axis of evil’ could use this 
technology to threaten the US or assist other  terrorist organizations.244 The trip by Kelly therefore, and 
the approach used, clearly exposed these US objectives in wanting to end a policy of engagement with a 
rogue nation and opt instead for an aggressive policy of hawk engagement with the ultimate purpose of 
regime change. 
A major criticism was then raised regarding the amount of evidence the US had regarding this 
accusation. Many now recognize the misrepresented and distorted intelligence data used by the US to 
justify the invasion of Iraq, and now apply this theory to assess the manner in which the US sought to 
reverse the previously established US policy of engagement toward North Korea.245 The Bush 
Administration achieved this by presenting a worst-case scenario as an indisputable truth and distorted 
intelligence on North Korea by seriously exaggerating the danger the production of North Korean 
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uranium based nuclear weapons.246 By failing to approach this issue delicately and distinguish between 
civilian and military uranium enrichment capabilities, the Bush Administration managed to not only 
renew tensions, but aggravated what would have already been difficult negotiations to end all North 
Korean nuclear developments and prevented the potential of future inspections.247 It is important to 
note in addition that Kelly’s accusations were not justified by US intelligence that reported meaningful 
enrichment North Korean capabilities as an uncertain possibility as North Korea still confronted many 
obstacles in producing enriched uranium nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration however, chose to 
exploit this intelligence for its own political purpose, the uranium issue thus “furnished powerful 
ammunition to render the Agreed Framework a dead letter”.248 Hawk engagement had thus dominated 
and succeeded in ending the Clinton Administrations policy of engagement. In addition, it is stated that 
the Bush Administration used this as a strategy to move South Korea and China away from conciliatory 
approaches to North Korea, and adopt a more hard-line approach that would then provide support for 
the US policy.249 If the US were to apply sanctions for instance, it would need the support of these allies, 
the Bush Administration hoped therefore to reverse not only the US policy, but the policies of China and 
South Korea in addition. 
At the end therefore, US-North Korean relations returned back to an environment of hostility and 
tension. With the end of the Agreed Framework came the even greater danger posed by the North 
Korean plutonium program that now no longer had any check as North Korea was no longer bound by 
the Agreed Framework.250 The plutonium program; that poses a greater threat than the suspected 
uranium enrichment program, could have been dealt with effectively under the Agreed Framework. The 
Bush Administration however not only compromised an effective solution to the plutonium program, 
but raised a new threat that simply went on to compound an already complicated nuclear situation. 
Furthermore, by opposing and ending the Agreed Framework, the Bush Administration blocked action 
on the threat of North Korea’s reprocessed plutonium that could be used to create a nuclear weapon or 
transferred to other parties that could present an even greater threat. The Bush Administration could 
have continued with the engagement policy under the Agreed Framework to continue building trust and 
reducing North Korea’s economic and political insecurities by providing concessions.251 This would have 
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allowed the Administration to adopt a more delicate approach in getting North Korea to permit 
inspections which would have prevented the US from making hostile accusations. The Bush 
Administration could have embraced the engagement policy of the Clinton Administration to work 
together with North Korea instead of adopting a policy that resulted in an even greater divide between 
the US and North Korea. The Bush Administration therefore, following the 2003 crisis, came under 
intense criticism stating that this Administration gave the impression that it wanted to preserve the 
North Korean threat.252 These arguments stated that despite progress in US-North Korean relations 
under the Clinton Administration; the Bush Administration diverted and opted for a more aggressive 
policy, being aware that it would antagonize North Korea further and then use this to justify the need 
for an aggressive policy against an antagonistic North Korea.253 Furthermore, by pursuing and continuing 
an aggressive policy, the Bush Administration maintained a crisis-driven relationship with North 
Korea.254 This only adds to the unpredictability that further fuels uncertainty and tensions. Hawk 
engagement as pursued by the Bush Administration did not allow for the Administration to engage 
unconditionally with North Korea, and this therefore did not end the dangerous cycle of confrontation, 
crisis and reluctant engagement that characterizes this crisis-driven relationship.255   
Both crises that occurred in 1993 and 2003 respectively, provided the US with an opportunity to engage 
with North Korea through substantial dialogue.256 Engagement, rather than confrontation, would fit in 
with Pyongyangs desire and key concern for US security assurances.257 This opportunity was embraced 
by the Clinton Administration that chose to deal with the 1993 crisis through engagement that resulted 
in the adoption of the Agreed Framework that facilitated progress toward normalized relations between 
the US and North Korea. The Bush Administration however, did not respond to the 2003 crisis in this 
manner. The Bush Administration should have been aware of the dynamics of North Korean 
brinkmanship that responds in a threatening manner to a perceived threat.258 Instead therefore of 
having continued with a hard-line aggressive policy, the Administration should have continued the 
engagement policy of the Clinton Administration that established a framework for progress that the 
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Bush Administration could have furthered. Critics therefore asserted that President Bush had missed an 
‘historic moment’ to further US-North Korean relations and achieve great success in neutralizing the 
North Korean threat by following up and leading on from where Clinton had left off.259 
The Bush Administration had failed to learn from the lessons of the first nuclear crisis in 1993.260 The 
Administration had ignored the number of concessions made by North Korea in the period leading up to 
the second crisis in 2003. North Korea had taken steps toward domestic reform, increased cooperation 
with Russia and sought to normalize relations with Japan. Family exchanges along with business contacts 
and cultural programs began between North and South Korea that illustrated progress in inter-Korean 
relations.261 The Bush Administration however failed to enhance and continue this progress by 
advancing the framework of engagement set up by the Clinton Administration. This policy reversal by 
the Bush Administration therefore saw North Korea revert back to a previous threatening posture as it 
reverted back to policies of brinkmanship. 
The Bush Administration failed in addition to learn from the lessons of all previous crises that resulted 
mainly based on North Korean insecurities and fears of a confrontation with the US. The US, to North 
Korea, represents a long and unbroken nuclear hegemony in East Asia where the US remains the only 
nation to have ever used nuclear weapons in a conflict situation, and in very close proximity to North 
Korea.262 During the Korean War, the US proposed the possibility of employing nuclear weapons against 
North Korea.263 Following from the Korean War, the US introduced ground-based nuclear weapons to 
South Korea in 1953, which directly violated the armistice agreement which prevented any such 
weapons acquisition by any party.264 Furthermore, the US and South Korea have held yearly joint 
exercises of ‘Team Spirit’ that clearly represented offensive military strategies.265 For these reasons 
therefore, it is clear to see the root of North Korean insecurities based on their fear of a US 
confrontation that leads North Korea to continually call for US security assurances. 
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 The Bush Administrations hard-line aggressive policy of hawk engagement therefore certainly did little 
to lessen these insecurities. It therefore came as no surprise that North Korea responded by reverting 
back to a threatening posture in pursuing their nuclear deterrent against the US.266 When North Korea 
admitted for instance, to the secret uranium project, this was a clear strategy of brinkmanship in which 
North Korea sought to improve its bargaining position in achieving a negotiated settlement with this 
more aggressive Administration.267 This threatening policy of brinkmanship represents North Korean 
efforts to bring the US Administration back to the bargaining table, as was done in 1993.268 This behavior 
by North Korea furthermore, is consistent with the North Korean desire for security assurances, “A 
security guarantee is what they want. It is the absolute conviction that they are under threat”.269 By 
adopting a hostile aggressive policy that made the possibility of a US nuclear strike on North Korea 
probable, President Bush simply maintained and fueled these North Korean insecurities. For North 
Korea then, no option was left but to revert back to policies of brinkmanship in which their nuclear 
program acted as the best deterrent to this threat. From 2003 therefore, North Korea strongly 
emphasized its ‘military-first ideology’. In response to a more aggressive US policy therefore, North 
Korea abandoned previous assurances made under the Agreed Framework and reverted back to nuclear 
developments as a need for a ‘powerful deterrent force’.270 
Instead of taking note of and recognizing the dynamics of North Korea’s previous negotiating behavior in 
which North Korea’s threatening posture was simply a strategy to achieve negotiation and allow for a 
normalization of relations, the US repeated the same mistake that led to the 1993 crisis.271 The Bush 
Administration believed that by demonizing North Korea as an ‘evil rogue state’, it could force North 
Korea into concessions.272 This Administration therefore adopted a firm policy stressing that “America 
and the world would not be blackmailed,” the results therefore of this firm, inflexible and 
uncompromising policy were unsurprising.273 North Korea became more threatening concluding that the 
only reliable way to prevent confrontation with the US, and deterring the US from objectives of regime 
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change in Pyongyang, would be to have and project a nuclear deterrent.274 Engagement and policies of 
diplomatic negotiation with North Korea was considered by the Bush Administration as mere policies of 
appeasement. Appeasement can be seen as a more passive approach of pacification, whereby the US 
would pacify the North Koreans through talk and negotiation, rather than adopt a stronger policy of 
confrontation.275 The Bush Administration opted therefore, for a more hard-line policy of hawk 
engagement that was considered more reasonable in attaining the desired objective of regime change in 
Pyongyang.276 It was this belief essentially that hampered the Bush Administration from taking into 
account the dynamics of North Korean negotiating behavior. The more hard-line policy of hawk 
engagement is derived from the traditional power approach. According to this approach, the more 
economically and militarily powerful state can wield control over and influence the weaker state into 
compliance. Adopting an approach based on power asymmetries, the traditional power approach 
explains how any non-compliance by the weaker state will be met with sanctions by the powerful state. 
In the case of North Korea however, the study has provided with evidence and various examples that 
illustrate what is referred to as a ‘paradoxical phenomenon’ of the ‘power of the weak’. North Korea, in 
line with the importance of the Juche ideology aimed to preserve and uphold state sovereignty, 
discussed in chapter one, maintains its nuclear program as a defensive power against the US offensive 
policy that threatens North Korean sovereignty. In this way then, the traditional power approach cannot 
account for a situation in which the weaker power adopts a nuclear program as a defensive strategy to 
counter the influence of the stronger US offensive power and thereby attain a certain influence over this 
stronger power. If the US threatens sanctions against North Korean non-compliance, North Korea will 
not submit but will instead revert to an even greater threatening strategy to ensure a stronger defence.  
North Korea therefore has a stronger motivational power as the stakes for North Korea are higher in 
having to ensure regime and state survival.277 It is this motivational power then that allows for North 
Korea to hold on to and enhance its nuclear program that acts as its defensive power.  As such, North 
Korea is not pressurized or influenced by an aggressive US policy. North Korea will not yield then, as is 
proposed by the traditional power approach, to US influence, power or pressure.278 A hard-line policy 
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would in essence then only fuel and increase the need for a greater North Korean defensive power. 
Adopting a hard-line policy therefore, with the sole purpose of achieving regime change in Pyongyang 
proved implausible and questionable then in light of these dynamics in North Korean behavior that 
existed well before the Bush Administration, which it is clear then that the administration either failed 
to take note of or simply chose to ignore. Hawk engagement, which pursued both engagement and 
military action, was clearly spelt out in the Armitage Report stating that “One cannot expect North 
Korea to take US diplomacy seriously unless we demonstrate unambiguously that the United States is 
prepared to bolster its…military posture.”279 Various criticisms therefore rightly questioned how the 
Bush Administration expected to pursue engagement while preparing for war at the same time, the very 
cause of North Korean insecurity that simply maintained a defensive North Korean posture.280 The Bush 
Administration refused to adopt a policy of engagement alone that it believed would remain vulnerable 
to North Korean brinkmanship.281 The Bush Administration failed then to recognize the empirical pattern 
in North Korean behavior.282  If lessons were learnt from the Clinton Administration, the Bush 
Administration would have recognized that when the US adopted an aggressive policy to pressure North 
Korea into concessions, North Korea responded with more hostility. By contrast, when the US adopted a 
more cooperative attitude that facilitated a move toward normalized relations, North Korea responded 
with concessions.283 The 1993 crisis clearly stood as an example of this for the Bush Administration 
whereby tension had decreased only when the US adopted a ‘give-and-take’ diplomatic strategy that 
provided North Korea with incentives for giving up the nuclear option by lessening North Korean 
insecurities.284 The Bush Administration however continued to follow a hard-line policy of hawk 
engagement that simply fueled tensions further leading to another crisis in 2006 and an escalation in the 
North Korean nuclear threat that at the end of its term, the Bush Administration failed to neutralize.  
Following from the 2003 crisis, the Bush Administration continued with its inflexible and 
uncompromising hard-line policy. The Administration continued to set conditions for negotiation calling 
for a settlement to issues in a multilateral setting, even though North Korea, and regional partners 
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themselves, called for bilateral talks between the US and North Korea.285 In addition, the Administration 
refused still to provide North Korea with incentives, despite the progress incentives had brought under 
the Clinton Administration.286 For the Bush Administration, there was a strict refusal to ‘reward bad 
behavior’.287 In keeping with these themes, the US proposed a new denuclearization agreement with 
North Korea at the six party negotiations.288 These talks would facilitate a multilateral setting for 
negotiations, sought by the US, to include the participation of China, South Korea, Japan and Russia and 
North Korea.  From the outset however, the six party talks represented a setting in which the US simply 
reinforced their uncompromising and inflexible policy. From the very first meeting, the Bush 
Administration adopted an antagonistic attitude by demanding that North Korea first admit to the 
existence of the alleged uranium enrichment program. Beginning in such a manner would clearly not 
facilitate an environment that would lessen the tension and hostility and furthermore, the Bush 
Administrations precondition hampered the potential for effective and constructive negotiation and 
cooperation from taking place.289 
By pursuing multilateral talks, the US had given the idea that it sought to address the North Korean 
situation diplomatically, it soon became clear however that this ‘diplomacy’ simply entailed making 
unilateral demands on North Korea that ultimately disrupted and hampered any effective negotiation 
and progress.290 For example, in the very first multilateral six party talks, the US had agreed to provide 
North Korea with renewed energy aid, humanitarian assistance and a security assurance not to attack, 
only if North Korea completely dismantled its nuclear program and agreed in addition to international 
inspections. This US demand became known as the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement 
(CVID) of the entire North Korean nuclear program.291 The Bush Administration therefore, did not 
provide incentives first, to establish a more co-operative environment to lessen North Korean insecurity 
as was done by the Clinton Administration in 1993. As such, the Bush Administration had not raised the 
stakes for North Korea within these multilateral talks by being able to, at a later stage, remove 
incentives unless North Korea comply. 
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 As discussed previously, the Bush Administration could have in this way, transformed the ‘carrots’ into 
‘sticks’ to ensure North Korean compliance. The Bush Administration however, refused to provide any 
incentives and as such had no ‘ammunition’ to use against North Korea at a later stage. It is not 
surprising therefore that North Korea maintained its threatening posture, calling for the US to give up its 
hostile policy and provide a security assurance after which North Korea would then agree to 
verification.292 This is yet another example of North Korea’s bargaining tactic of North Korean 
brinkmanship seeking an assurance and incentives for giving up its nuclear option. The Bush 
Administration should have been aware of these dynamics and responded in a manner therefore that 
would provide some incentive to allow for North Korea to compromise in turn. The failure of the Bush 
Administration policy then in achieving this outcome is clearly represented in North Koreas refusal to 
participate in the 2004 multilateral six party talks based on what they considered a hostile policy of the 
US that continues to demand for CVID.293 Further evidence of a hostile US approach was seen in the 
adoption of the 2004 Human Rights Act.294 This act essentially banned economic aid to North Korea 
unless progress was made on human rights; once again therefore, the US placed conditions on 
incentives and went further by intervening in what North Korea considers a sensitive sovereign issue.295 
The Act further antagonized North Korea by providing US$ 4 million for radio broadcasts into North 
Korea promoting democracy and a further US$20 million to groups and programs fostering human 
rights.296 This Act therefore clearly exposed the US intentions against the communist regime and further 
exposed in addition the US desire for regime change in Pyongyang. 
 North Korea continued however to show its willingness to cooperate if the US provided with a security 
guarantee and therefore still represented the same policy of brinkmanship from the 1990’s.297 The 
difference now however, was that the stakes for North Korea were higher that led the North Koreans to 
actually claim the existence of nuclear weapons.298 At this point however, the absence of any nuclear 
testing resulted in uncertainty and ambiguity. Events in 2006 however, brought the situation once again 
to a crisis point.  
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With the re-election of the Bush Administration came the continuation of the hard-line US policy. In 
President Bush’s inaugural speech, focus was given to his new objective of ending tyranny which 
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice took further in including North Korea in a list of ‘six outposts of 
tyranny’.299 In addition, US officials provided ‘evidence’ that alleged North Korean processed uranium 
sales to Libya. All these actions therefore clearly represent a continuation of an aggressive and hostile 
policy of the U to North Korea that only went on to escalate tension and instability. It was therefore not 
surprising that North Koreans responded by declaring a statement that North Korea had “manufactured 
nukes for self defence to cope with the Bush Administrations undisguised policy to isolate and stifle 
(North Korea).”300 This led many commentators to state that the policy choice of the Bush 
Administration therefore, only strengthened and allowed North Korea to expand its nuclear 
capabilities.301 With a lack of cooperation between North Korea and the US and further strained 
relations, tensions finally mounted to another nuclear crisis when North Korea conducted a missile and 
test explosion of a nuclear device.302 The six party talks then resumed in 2007, after a stalemate in 
negotiation between North Korea and the US, whereby Resolution 1718 was adopted to condemn any 
nuclear or atomic testing by North Korea.303 Furthermore, the 2007 six party talks saw the adoption of 
the ‘Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement’ calling for North Korea to abandon all 
nuclear developments.304 In keeping with the agreements, North Korea permitted inspections by the 
IAEA and went on to shut down and seal its main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon under IAEA supervision. 
Bush went on in 2008 to remove North Korea from the US list of State sponsors of terrorism.305  
Progress however came to a halt when the US expressed dissatisfaction that the agreement had not 
adequately addressed issues of North Koreas past procurement efforts and its suspected proliferation 
activities with other ‘rogue’ states.306 North Korea on the other hand expressed dissatisfaction with the 
slow rate at which it was receiving aid. Throughout the six party talks furthermore, the US continued to 
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call for CVID while North Korea pushed for ‘freeze for compensation’.307  This inflexibility of both parties, 
where the US was unwilling to fully accept  proposal by all other parties to provide aid to north Korea in 
the initial ‘freeze’ phase of nuclear dismantlement.308 This ultimately prevented any breakthroughs from 
being achieved.309 By the end of 2008, the six party talks reached a deadlock over issues regarding the 
verification of North Koreas nuclear activities.310 These multilateral talks therefore failed to address the 
North Korean nuclear situation as both the US and North Korea maintained opposing views. Animosity 
between the US and North Korea increased, seen by Bush calling Kim Jong-Il a ‘tyrant’ during his 
presidential campaign and North Korea responding by calling Bush a ‘political idiot’.311 These were clear 
signs then of a strained US-North Korean relation based on animosity and hostility that would allow for 
anything but genuine engagement. 
 In the end, genuine negotiation and cooperation was hampered by the Bush Administrations 
unrelenting emphasis to address issues of verification, instead of using the multilateral talks as a 
framework for genuine engagement to lessen the tension in US-North Korean relations and create an 
environment to facilitate progress. The Bush Administration therefore failed again to grasp the six party 
talks, which resulted from the 2003 crisis, as an opportunity to engage with the North Koreans. As such, 
the Bush Administration failed to negotiate and cooperate with all parties to ensure the neutralization 
of the North Korean nuclear situation. In failing again to adopt a more conciliatory policy to facilitate 
genuine engagement the Bush Administration only went on to give North Korea more time in the stalled 
negotiation process to strengthen its nuclear deterrent.312 The 2006 stalemate at the six party talks, 
following North Koreas missile and nuclear detonation tests was said to represent a clear sign of a failing 
Bush policy.313 The Bush Administration, once again, constrained with bureaucratic squabbling, failed to 
build a cohesive multilateral coalition in support for its efforts and in addition failed to genuinely engage 
with Pyongyang in a series of negotiation based on its unwillingness to adopt a more flexible 
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approach.314 The Bush Administration needed to adopt a policy of enhanced engagement to articulate a 
positive vision for the Korean peninsula that would lessen North Korean insecurity and build a common 
ground with Pyongyang.315          
3.2 Recommendations on Policy Objectives that should have been adopted by the Bush Administration. 
The study has thus far illustrated the ways in which the hard-line policy of hawk engagement adopted 
and maintained by the Bush Administration has only compounded an already tense, hostile and unstable 
nuclear situation with North Korea. A discussion will now be given surrounding the need for a policy of 
engagement, away from any form of confrontation, as the best means for resolving this situation and 
allowing for engagement to shape an active process of reconciliation.316 This is a policy objective that 
should have been adopted by the Bush Administration and demands important consideration by the 
Obama Administration. Genuine engagement provides a better option away from inflexible and 
uncompromising policies that simply fuel tensions leading to greater a possibility and potential for 
military conflict over North Korea or an arms race in East Asia.317 
Engagement should always remain the most viable policy option for the US when dealing with North 
Korea since the traditional power approach, as discussed previously does not apply to the North Korean 
situation. Since the US cannot use its military power in a coercive way to get North Korea to submit as 
this only escalated North Korean nuclear defensive developments, engagement would prove more 
effective.318 In this way, an engaged North Korea would be more conducive to stability than a desperate 
North Korea whose only security option lies in nuclear developments against a hostile coercive US 
policy.319 In looking to the example of the Agreed Framework, then US Secretary of State, Madeline 
Albright, acknowledged that North Korea was abiding by all agreements. It was the US that had fallen 
behind on its promise of oil shipments and the construction of the LWRs. Based on this, the North 
Koreans had test fired missiles in 1998 as a reflection of their dissatisfaction over the lack of progress in 
bilateral negotiation. In addition to negotiation therefore, it is imperative for the US to abide by all 
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promises made which will then build confidence in bilateral negotiation and thereby strengthen 
engagement to allow for greater progress.320 
Engagement and the provision of incentives furthermore, as proposed under the prospect theory, would 
prevent the crystallization of conditions under which North Korea calculates aggression and a 
threatening posture as its only course of action.321 On this point, it is important to draw vital insight from 
the preemptive/preventive rationale. Hostile coercive bargaining by North Korea reflects the 
preemptive/preventive logic. The dynamics of North Korean coercive bargaining represents disruptive 
acts and unruly behavior by North Korea that are not serious enough to start a war but are dangerous 
enough to attract attention and result in crisis. Policies of engagement therefore stand to facilitate an 
environment of engagement and cooperation by providing with incentives to North Korea thereby 
raising North Korean stakes in these negotiations as it now has something to either gain or lose.  As 
such, incentives can be turned into ‘ammunition’ or ‘sticks’ to be used against North Korea if North 
Korea disrupts negotiations with any unruly behavior and the chances therefore of North Korea 
maintaining coercive bargaining in thus greatly lessened.322 Non-communication, threats and 
intimidation in contrast, pursued by the US under hard-line policies of hawk engagement, stand only to 
exacerbate preemptive/preventive situations in which North Korea is most likely to adopt coercive 
bargaining and aggression based on their vulnerability and insecurity. This situation only pushes North 
Korea further into the domain of losses, explaining North Korea’s adoption then of nuclear 
developments as a defensive deterrent to prevent this loss, mainly a loss of sovereignty. The 1998 
hostile North Korean acts for instance were met with the Perry recommendations calling for more 
engagement with North Korea that in addition, sought to provide North Korea with financial aid, 
humanitarian assistance and political normalization.323 The Clinton Administration had therefore taken 
North Korea out of a situation of loss and placed North Korea instead within the Agreed Framework 
where it now had a stake in the status quo. This resulted in North Korea refraining from further hostile 
acts until 2003, when the Bush Administration had switched to adopt a more aggressive hard-line policy 
that caused North Korea to revert back to coercive bargaining strategies of brinkmanship. The dynamics 
therefore of engagement to prevent preemptive/preventive actions by North Korea are clear. This logic 
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of preemption, prevention and engagement stems from the rational deterrence theory.324 Engagement, 
as represented by the policy followed by the Clinton Administration that led to the adoption of the 
Agreed Framework, carried fewer costs. The Bush Administration however, suffered the costs of North 
Korean brinkmanship by opting instead for a hard-line policy that of coercion and isolation. The Bush 
Administration therefore faced a greater North Korean defensive power as it chose to pursue a more 
offensive policy.325   
The policy of engagement and the provision of incentives furthermore, lays the groundwork for a 
coalition of punishment at a later stage if North Korea defects.326 The Bush Administration was never 
able to achieve a regional consensus to impose sanctions on North Korea. This was based mainly on the 
basis that the Bush Administration had immediately pursued a coercive strategy against North Korea as 
regional partners felt the US as proceeding prematurely to a coercive policy. The Bush Administration 
should have instead, first sought a policy of continued engagement with North Korea, which the regional 
partners favored, and in this way build a coalition of support for coercive action once non-
confrontational methods have been exhausted.327 Only if non-confrontational methods have been 
exhausted, should the US turn to aggressive and coercive policies. Engagement creates a process of 
notifying North Korea that it could be facing its last chance for cooperation and in this way allows for a 
coalition to be built for punishment should North Korea defect.328 The Bush Administration therefore 
wrongly judged the Agreed Framework as an ‘open-ended appeasement’ policy that rewarded bad 
behavior. The administration should have instead paid greater importance to the reasoning of former 
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage that “diplomacy strengthens the ability to build and sustain 
a coalition if North Korea does not cooperate…”329 The Bush Administration however, chose 
immediately to use incentives as sticks without having given North Korea a stake in the status quo. By 
pursuing a policy of engagement therefore, that provides various incentives to North Korea thereby 
raising North Korean stakes in the status quo; the US is able to tactically build a coalition of punishment 
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should North Korea defect. Engagement therefore, in this manner, facilitates a policy that will ensure 
progress and at the same time, maintains a security net to respond to North Korean defiance.330 
This policy of engagement that suggests the provision of incentives in order to raise the stakes for North 
Korea thereby being able to influence and control North Korean behavior is line with the prospect 
theory. North Korea’s threat perception of the US was considerably high given the aggressive and hard-
line policy of hawk engagement pursued by the Bush Administration.331 This threat perception resulted 
in an increase in North Korean insecurities and fears regarding the threat of the US against North Korean 
regime and state survival.332 For this reason, the adoption of an aggressive policy that imposes sanctions 
or adopts any such confrontational approach should be abandoned as it stands only to escalate the 
possibility of a preemptive strike by North Korea or the continuation of North Koreas nuclear deterrent 
and coercive bargaining.333 According to this theory, any actor that perceives themselves to be in the 
domain of loss tends to be risk prone, as is clearly the case with North Korea who always turned to 
threatening and risky policies of brinkmanship.334 On the other hand, the actor that perceives 
themselves to be in the area of gain, as North Korea found themselves to be in upon the adoption of the 
Agreed Framework, tends to be reluctant of any risk. Applying this theory to North Korea therefore, 
preemptive or preventive strike will always be an option for North Korea, which aims to avoid the 
certainty of loss, given an uncompromising and inflexible US policy.335 If faced however, with a more 
cooperative US that encourages and upholds genuine engagement that places North Korea in the 
domain of gain by offering concrete incentives, North Korea would not risk any gain by continuing with 
coercive strategies of brinkmanship.336 
3.3 Idealism and the Bush Administration    
The strongest argument by the US against engagement is based on the Bush Administrations ideational 
tendencies.337 The study will now proceed with a discussion on the reasons why the Bush Administration 
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chose to follow a hard-line policy of hawk engagement that did not neutralize, but in many instances 
only fueled the North Korean nuclear threat. As discussed previously, the Bush Administration viewed 
policies of engagement as appeasement that would not be sufficient in dealing with a ‘rogue’ nation. 
The Administration felt that engagement with North Korea would send the wrong message to other 
rogue nations resulting in a view by these nations of a weak US. Seeking accommodation therefore, in 
terms of adopting policies of engagement, was considered morally unacceptable. The main criticism 
against this view states that nations like North Korea should not be viewed as moral deviants that need 
to be reprimanded, but rather as problems that need to be solved.338 This is essentially the main weak 
point of the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration chose to follow a policy based on idealism 
whereby it had followed the Cold War ideological schism of separating free and democratic states from 
evil rogue nations.339 The Bush Administration viewed North Korea as a rogue state that disregards 
human rights, aspiring to possess weapons of mass destruction and therefore remains outside the 
sphere of ‘good,’ needing to be controlled and contained.340 There are countless examples to represent 
these US views of North Korea, for instance, Vice President, Dick Cheney stating “we don’t negotiate 
with evil, we defeat it.”341 
When dealing with North Korea, the Bush Administration made the mistake of applying this familiar 
policy template of the Cold War to understand the nature of the North Korean threat.342 This was the 
main weakness then in fitting threats to policies, instead of policies to threats.343 This was dangerous in 
addition, as a policy that brought peace in one era could result in conflict in another, and this is exactly 
what happened in the case of North Korea.344 The Bush Administration had always exposed its views of 
North Korea as a rogue state that it refused to bargain with, and the US tendency to demonize rogue 
states only intensified following the terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001.345 The result was an 
increase in hostility and tension in US-North Korean relations that often resulted in crisis. The Bush 
Administration therefore, in dealing with North Korea, had always exposed the tendency to abide by 
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moral and ideological convictions in dividing the world between ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ reaffirmed in the word 
of President Bush making it clear that, “you are either with us or against us.”346       
In his Presidential campaign in 1999, Bush stated that US foreign policy “required tough realism in our 
dealings with China and Russia. It requires firmness with regimes like North Korea and Iraq, regimes that 
hate our values…”347 This is an example of Bush proposing a policy based on realism seen again in his 
first major foreign policy speech stating that, “a President must be a clear-eyed realist.”348 In practice 
however, the Bush Administration followed anything but a policy based on realism.349 In order to 
illustrate the divergent policy ideals of the Bush Administration from that of realism, it is important to 
begin with an outline on the key aspects of realism.  In the realist school, the world is made up of 
sovereign states where military power holds great importance.350 Realists furthermore view material 
strength, and not ideological views, as a key component in a world where the main threat to a nations 
sovereignty is seen in the military strength of other nations. For realists, placing hope in international 
institutions and the spreading of democracy amounts in the end to ‘fruitless dreaming,’ morality and 
ideological predispositions therefore have no meaningful role to play in state policy.351 The Bush 
Administrations foreign policy however diverges from these realist aspects in many ways. 
 
The most glaring example can be seen in the actions taken by the US when dealing with Iraq. The US 
invasion and occupation was explained by the Bush Administration as a mission to create a democratic 
government.352 This clearly exposed the US objective to spread the ideal of democracy as President Bush 
adopted an almost ‘missionary sense of America’s role’. These ideational tendencies and the obvious 
moral streak runs counter the principles or realism.353 As discussed previously, in the case of North 
Korea, the Bush Administration had adopted the Human Rights Act to essentially promote democratic 
freedoms. Abiding by polices of hawk engagement, the objective is to provide aid that can then act as an 
investment by spurring the North Korean people to fight against the regime.354 This is clearly evident in 
the statement by Bush that “We (US) want them to have food. And at the same time, we want them to 
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have freedom.”355 This again illustrates a US foreign policy based on idealism and moral convictions of 
spreading democracy as a tool when dealing with ‘rogue nations’.356 The Bush Administration has always 
referred to the strength of US values as ideals as important components of the country’s strength, 
diverting from the realist notions of a countries strength solely determined by military power and 
capability. In relying on the values and strength of the US ideals, the Bush Administration adopted the 
view that a change in ideology can radically change the nature of the threat. This however was not 
achieved in the case of North Korea. The more the Bush Administration isolated North Korea as an evil 
rogue state as part of an outpost of tyranny a stated by Condoleezza Rice in 2005, the more North Korea 
responded with greater hostility. Moreover, the US adopted the tendency to group democratic, like-
minded nations as part of the periphery while undemocratic, or ‘un-free’ nations made up the core. 
According to Bush, like-minded democratic nations share common interest that prevents the possibility 
of conflict, and therefore there is a need to spread democracy to ensure peace among nations.357 This 
however has little to do with realism where sovereign states do not share common interests or work 
together to promote peace and stability. 
 
This policy, based on idealism furthermore, represented the tendency of Bush to measure counterparts 
by a moral standard which once again prevented the US from adopting an approach that would 
effectively deal with the North Korean situation without exacerbating tensions further.358 In an interview 
for instance, Bush reacted by stating, “I loathe Kim Jong-Il! Maybe it’s my religion, maybe it’s my-but I 
feel passionate about this.”359 These moral, passionate views which guide US policy ideals further 
separate the US policy from realism and go on to exacerbate tensions that are only compounded by an 
aggressive US policy that creates a divide between democratic and undemocratic nations. This is 
strategy is therefore counterproductive as it did not allow for the US to adopt a policy of genuine 
engagement as the US strictly abided by views that  “we (US) don’t negotiate with evil, we defeat it.”360 
The Bush Administration, in light of these views, has on countless occasions expressed distaste for 
engaging North Korea diplomatically and this continues to express the Administrations deep conviction 
that North Korea is a rogue state that cannot be ‘rewarded for bad behavior’ and is thus not seen as a 
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sovereign equal.361 Once again, this prevented the Administration from engaging with North Korea 
effectively as the gap between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ remained where the Administration refused to adjust its 
uncompromising and inflexible policy in dealing with what it considered a rogue nation.    Delivering his 
second inaugural address, Bush stated that it is “the policy of the United States to seek and support the 
growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of 
ending tyranny in our world.”362 While North Korea was not mentioned by name, the mention of tyranny 
was a tactic reference to North Korea following Rice’s previous statement.363 As expected this went on 
to increase North Korean insecurities and anxieties that increased the gap between the US and North 
Korea, strained progress of the multilateral six party talks straining all potential therefore for genuine 
engagement and progress. Many observers thus responded by stating that Bush had “declared a holy 
war of liberty.”364 
In closing, the views of Bruce Klingner365 provide an essential and clear summary regarding the Bush 
Administrations North Korean policy. According to Mr. Klingner, the Bush Administration chose to follow 
two very different approaches, switching from one ineffective extreme to another.366 During the first six 
years, the Administration chose to follow an all sticks approach by adopting a more aggressive and often 
hostile policy that simply went on to fuel North Korean fears and insecurities. North Korea viewed the 
aggressive and hostile policy pursed by Bush as a strong US offensive aimed to achieve regime change. 
This stood therefore as a major threat to North Korean sovereignty, the most vital element of North 
Korean policies guided by the Juche ideology. For North Korea then, the only option was to develop a 
stronger defensive against this threat to ensure regime and state survival. Following the 2006, and 2009 
North Korean missile and rocket launches, this cycle became even clearer. North Korea continued to 
respond aggressively to a hostile US policy as followed by the Bush Administration that chose to 
maintain a hard-line policy of hawk engagement. The Bush Administration chose not to maintain and 
further the policies of engagement of the Clinton Administration that established notable progress and 
laid a platform for further progress and improvement, and as such, only aggravated what seemed to be 
moving toward, an improved North Korean situation. According to Mr. Klingner, the Bush Administration 
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should have followed a more integrated approach instead.367 This integrated approach in Mr. Klingenrs 
view, would require the use of all instruments of national power that would allow for a more 
coordinated strategy in which the Administration would have been able to continue negotiations with 
North Korea through diplomatic resolution while simultaneously using outside pressure to influence 
North Korea's negotiating behavior.  As was suggested throughout this chapter, the Bush Administration 
should have used the ‘carrots’ provided by the Clinton Administration to allow for a policy of 
engagement and be able then to turn these ‘carrots’ into ‘sticks’ to be used against North Korea if North 
Korea defects. In Mr. Klingners view, this would prove effective as the US would be combining 
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Chapter Four 
4. Future Prospects: The Obama Administration and the Road Ahead 
“North Korea has a choice: It can continue down the path of confrontation and provocation that 
has led to less security, less prosperity, and more isolation from the global community…or it can 
choose to become a full member of the international community, which will give a better life to 
its people by living up to international obligations and foregoing nuclear weapons.” (President 
Barack Obama, November 2009)368 
The study will now proceed with a discussion on the future prospects of US-North Korean relations by 
analyzing the current Administrations North Korean policy. Although it may be early to analyse the 
current Administrations North Korean policy, it is important to take note of the Administrations 
response to North Koreas recent nuclear tests and provocative behavior to determine the current weak 
points of the Administrations strategy; and to suggest therefore important recommendations for an 
improved US North Korean policy away from the failed Bush Administration policy. 
This chapter will begin with an outline of North Korean actions at the end of the Bush Administration 
term. This outline will provide with a discussion on the traditional strategy of brinkmanship used by 
North Korea and in addition will provide with a new outlook on the dynamics of North Korean 
provocative behavior. This outline will then allow for an analysis on the policy response of the Obama 
Administration; providing an argument that sees certain similarities to the policy response and choice of 
the Bush Administration; and arguments on the other hand that see certain positive policy departures 
from the Bush Administration. The chapter will furthermore, in light of the new outlook on the dynamics 
of North Korea’s provocative behavior, away from the traditional strategies of brinkmanship, suggest 
various recommendations that are needed if the new Administration is to succeed neutralizing the 
North Korean threat.    
 
 
4.1 North Korean nuclear developments and actions at the end of the Bush Administration term: A 
traditional strategy of brinkmanship vs. post-test analyses arguments (April, May, July 2009). 
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On April 5, 2009, just months after the election of President Obama, North Korea fired a missile directly 
over Japan in direct contravention of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718.369 
This Resolution forbids any nuclear or ballistic missile testing and development by North Korea. North 
Korean provocative acts continued just a month later when North Korea conducted its second nuclear 
test since October 2006.370 Very similar to previous North Korea actions in 2003 and 2006, North Korea 
expelled monitors of the IAEA and walked out from six party talks following international condemnation 
of the April test-firings. These provocative acts carry with them serious implications. Not only do they 
represent the failure of the Bush Administration in having neutralized these hostile and aggressive 
nuclear threats, but in addition, they represent North Koreas continuing progress and advancement in 
nuclear developments. The May 2009 nuclear test verified that North Korea had successfully 
manufactured a nuclear device and in addition, the notable success of the launching of the Taepodong-2 
missile in contrast to the failed 2006 launch, represents significant progress in North Korean  missile 
capability.371 The successful launches of scud and No-dong missiles in July 2009 furthermore, represent 
progressing North Korean capabilities of attacking South Korea and Japan with ballistic missiles.372 The 
North Korean nuclear threat then is clearly growing and thus demands serious attention if greater 
provocative acts by North Korea are to be prevented. 
There are many arguments that see these provocative acts as the traditional North Korean strategy of 
brinkmanship whereby North Korea adopts a threatening posture and engages in provocative acts to get 
the attention of the US to engage with North Korea and gain concessions. Just as North Korea had done 
on many occasions before, North Korea engages in provocative acts as it takes the necessary steps to 
prepare for talks with the US, hence, North Korea is playing the same game it played before with both 
the Clinton and Bush Administration.373 North Korean provocative and aggressive acts in April and May 
2009 suggest that North Korea has taken note of President Obama’s willingness for engagement and has 
thus used these acts in maintaining strategies of brinkmanship to strengthen its bargaining position. 
These acts were not surprising given North Korean threats to withdraw from the NPT in 1993 just after 
Clinton was inaugurated, or the North Korean launch of the Taepodong-1 in 1998 when Kim Dae-jung 
had just become President of South Korea and initiated his ‘sunshine policy’ of engagement with North 
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Korea. North Korean provocative acts in April and May 2009 therefore represent a repetition of North 
Korean brinkmanship diplomacy of which Obama has become the latest target. This argument that 
discusses the North Korean policy of brinkmanship, explains this as a strategy resulting from North 
Korean insecurity and fears against the US.374  
These arguments seem valid given North Koreas continued indication of the threat they perceive from 
the US and the continued persistence therefore to maintain a military and nuclear deterrent.375 This 
strategy of brinkmanship, given North Korean insecurities against the US, is evident in North Koreas 
provocative and threatening actions taken in 1994, 2003 and again in 2006 where North Korea believed 
this to be the only option available in getting the US to engage in serious dialogue.376 This argument of 
North Korean brinkmanship as a strategy to engage with the US is used again therefore to explain the 
reasoning behind North Korean actions in 2009. Prior to the April and May tests North Korea, in January 
2009, continued to push for a normalization of diplomatic relations with the US, that it felt should take 
precedence over denuclearization.377 The new Administration however responded by stating that 
normalized relations will only be possible with complete and verifiable North Korean denuclearization. 
The North Koreans however maintained that North Koreas “status as nuclear weapons state will remain 
unchanged as long as it is exposed to the slightest U.S nuclear threat.”378 This would once again reaffirm 
the argument of North Korean insecurity that drives policies of brinkmanship in adopting a threatening 
position and engaging in aggressive acts to secure a defensive against the US threat and in addition 
ensure bilateral engagement with the US to facilitate the normalization of relations. 
This point is further evident in a statement by Selig Harrison, Director of the Asian program at the 
Washington-based Center for International policy, stating that North Korea’s slogan is “denuclearization 
through normalization, not normalization through denuclearization.”379  This argument can then be 
applied to North Koreas actions in 2009 where it is believed that North Korea maintained the strategy of 
brinkmanship in order to secure bilateral talks with the US. By launching missiles and conducting nuclear 
tests, North Korea hoped to put nuclear and missiles issues, its best bargaining chip, on the table for 
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negotiation, which North Korea believes would strengthen their bargaining position.380 According to 
North Korean policies of brinkmanship, missile and nuclear developments provide North Korea with 
greater leverage that enables them to achieve various concessions and incentives, the most important 
being the normalization of US-North Korean relations. North Korea has persistently sought to attain a 
new peace mechanism to replace the 1953 Armistice Agreement to facilitate a normalization of relations 
and legally end confrontation with the US. Once again, this points to the insecurity of North Korea of a 
perceived US threat. In order to secure and ensure talks on this issue then, North Korea will continue 
with such provocative acts until the US engages with North Korea and adopts a mechanism to facilitate a 
normalization of relations. This once again does not break with North Korean previous calls in 1993 and 
1994 for a peace agreement to replace the Armistice Agreement.381  
This argument therefore looks to the actions taken by North Korea in 2009 as a traditional North Korean 
strategy of brinkmanship aimed to bring the US to the bargaining table and achieve the important goal 
of a normalization of relations with the US given their insecurities. In this way, North Korean nuclear 
developments and provocative actions are seen as an offensive to the US defensive that North Korea 
will only submit once it has a new peace agreement with the US. Until that is not achieved then, North 
Korea will not surrender its best bargaining chip.382 
There is a different argument however, that provides a new outlook regarding the reason for and 
implication of North Korean provocative and hostile acts that breaks from the explanation around North 
Koreas traditional policy of brinkmanship given North Korean insecurities and need for bilateral 
engagement with the US. A discussion on both arguments is essential as an analysis of both arguments 
regarding North Korean behavior will allow for carefully constructed policy options and 
recommendations for the Obama Administration when dealing with North Korea.  
The latest set of North Korean provocative actions sees North Korea threatening future ballistic missile 
tests, a retaliation of a ‘nuclear war’ against any sanctions, a demand for an apology following 
condemnation against the April testing and a refusal to return to the six party talks.383 Thus far it has 
been illustrated how these actions have always been explained as a North Korean tactic of brinkmanship 
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to get the attention of the US, drawing them into bilateral engagement and negotiation. The North 
Korean nuclear test in 2006 for instance, was often explained to have been the result of the Bush 
Administrations reluctance to engage in high-level bilateral talks with the North Koreans. Arguments 
however now arise against these traditional explanations, explaining instead how these explanations 
have resulted in an unhelpful dynamic in which the reason and cause for North Korean aggressive and 
provocative behavior was explained to be a result of US inaction or aggressive postures. As such, the 
cause and reason for North Korean aggressive behavior was rarely seen or explained by looking to North 
Korean intentions instead. The advent of the Obama Administration brought this new outlook to light by 
illustrating that even when the US clearly stated an interest and willingness to engage and negotiate 
with North Korea, North Korea responded in an aggressive and provocative manner despite the 
immediate trip of US Ambassador Stephen Bosworth to North Korea that further reaffirmed the 
commitment of the Administration.384                                    
This commitment to engagement continues till date given US plans to send a special US envoy in 
December to North Korea, again, headed by Stephen Bosworth, for direct talks, despite North Korean 
provocative acts of further missile testing in October 2009.385 Despite clear US efforts by the new 
Administration to engage North Korea, these continuing provocative and aggressive acts, it is now 
argued, can no longer be rationalized as an attempt to engage with the US.386 The clear call for 
engagement by the Obama Administration had illustrated that arguments can no longer justify North 
Korean provocative actions to US inaction or lack of commitment to negotiation. Unlike the Bush 
Administration, the Obama Administration had not entered with an aggressive and hard-line policy, it 
stated for the outset firm commitment for both unilateral and multilateral negotiation that would result 
in assistance, diplomatic normalization and the creation of a new Northeast Asian Peace and Security 
Regime for North Korean denuclearization.387 This is a point that was clearly reaffirm by Obama stating, 
“the door is open to resolving these issues peacefully, for North Korea to see over time the reduction of 
sanctions and its increasing integration into the international community…but it will only happen if 
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North Korea is taking serious steps around the nuclear issue.”388 This statement in addition, represents 
an important break from the Bush Administrations policy of hawk engagement that does not commit 
time to policy, the Obama Administration on the other hand represents a policy that sees engagement 
as taking time in which greater interaction would be facilitated, allowing for North Korea to slowly open 
up to reform.389 North Korean objectives furthermore, for aid, assistance and a normalization of 
relations were presented as attainable in a peaceful manner of engagement, yet North Korea still chose 
to defect.  This new outlook then questions what the reasoning behind North Korean provocative 
behavior truly is.        
The April missile test of the alleged long-range Taepodong-2 with the potential to strike as far as Hawaii 
and Alaska was more successful than the July 2006 missile test.390 The July 2009 missile testing 
illustrated the improved accuracy of the North Korean short and medium range missile capability. 
Finally, the May 2009 nuclear test indicated the existence of a 3-8 kiloton nuclear weapon. These 
developments are seen by many, not as a North Korean strategy to seek attention and demonstrate its 
toughness to draw the US into bilateral talk.391 Instead, post-test analyses argue that these tests expose 
North Korean intentions to build a better nuclear weapon and ballistic missile.392 Many traditional 
arguments, as stated previously, have argued that North Korea seeks a nuclear program to better its 
bargaining position, provide a defensive and enforce policies of brinkmanship as there are no better 
options of aid and assistance, there is a lack of commitment or action by the US to engage with North 
Korea, and various elements, such as an aggressive US policy, that fuel North Korean insecurities. The 
argument however ignores the fact that these incentives have been offered to North Korea in the 1994 
Agreed Framework and again in the 2005 six party Joint Statement.  According to the post-test analyses 
of North Korean acts in April, May and July 2009 then, what North Korea really wants is to be accepted 
as a nuclear state by the US.393 This argument states that North Korea could be aiming, through more 
provocative acts, to turn the six party talks, which the Obama Administration has pushed for from the 
outset, into bilateral US-North Korean nuclear arms negotiations. It is suggested that North Korea would 
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aim for an agreement similar to that accorded to India, whereby North Korea would return to the IAEA 
safeguards and monitoring while being assured of a civilian nuclear element and in addition would have 
control over a part of their nuclear and energy weapons program . This argument seems plausible given 
North Korea’s continual call for the construction of the LWRs that were promised back in 1994. Although 
it is true that North Korea has never tabled these aims, signs of these intentions are evident with North 
Koreas continued rejection of negotiations on denuclearization, North Koreas continual reference to 
their de facto nuclear weapons status and their demand that they be treated like India and Pakistan. All 
these actions should be considered as it offers a new outlook into the possible intention of North Korea 
which the Obama Administration would need to address.394 Furthermore, North Korea announced in 
June 2009 that it would begin enriching uranium and build its own LWRs.395 North Korea had therefore 
taken the step to admit to a uranium-enrichment program.  Ultimately then, this argument states North 
Korean intentions of wanting to be treated like India and Pakistan , nuclear states who possess nuclear 
weapons outside of the NPT and still maintain normal relations with the US.396           
Post-test analyses then proceeds to discuss the issue around North Korean insecurity. According to the 
‘apologists’ or traditional arguments around North Korean insecurity, North Korea’s provocative acts 
were based on insecurities against the US hostile and aggressive policies, Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ or Rice’s 
reference to North Korea as part of the ‘outpost of tyranny’ for instance.397 Although there are indeed 
various reasons why North Korea would have cause to fear a militarily and economically stronger and 
superior US, one cannot disregard the US’s countless statements of non-hostile intent toward North 
Korea. The Obama Administration continues today to enforce this assurance stating that the US is “more 
than willing to engage in negotiation to get North Korea on a path of peaceful coexistence…and we want 
to encourage their prosperity.”398 North Korea however, dismissed this as empty words, much as it had 
done with regards to the negative security assurance given by the US in 2005, which North Korea 
dismissed as a piece of paper with no meaning. In essence, this argument illustrates a further North 
Korean intention of not wanting a negative security assurance, but rather, a special type of ‘regime 
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security assurance.’399 The argument then gives a clear reason of North Korean insecurity based on the 
reform dilemma that North Korea faces. The US, even under the Obama Administration continues to call 
for negotiation and engagement in which aid and assistance would be given upon denuclearization. For 
North Korea however, there is a realization that if it does indeed give up its nuclear option, and attain 
aid and assistance, vital for state survival, this could cause a threat to regime survival.400 In receiving aid 
and assistance, North Korea would have to open up, with this comes the entry of influence from the 
outside world that could result in a decentralization of economic and political power away from the 
regime and thus threatens regime security.401 Giving up its nuclear option then does not seem like a 
viable option for a country embracing the Juche ideology as the ruling ideology that reinforces the 
principle of sovereignty and self-sufficiency against any foreign intervention that threatens state and 
regime survival.402 The stubborn call of the US therefore for negotiation and engagement for aid and 
assistance upon denuclearization then does not seem appropriate given North Korea’s firm resolve to 
maintain regime survival that is ultimately tied to nuclear developments.     
4.2 The Current Administrations North Korean policy: Weaknesses and Recommendations 
In light of the post-test analyses, various suggestions are set forth for the Obama Administration in 
dealing with a North Korea whereby; provocative acts expose true intentions of attaining a nuclear 
status. The Obama Administration would need to work toward the implementation of sanctions through 
UNSCR 1874, passed prior to the May 2009 nuclear testing.403 In addition, the Administration would 
need to work toward the establishment and institutionalization of a multilateral counterproliferation 
regime against North Korean nuclear weapons so as to prevent the emergence of North Korea as a 
nuclear state. The Obama Administration needs to illustrate that such resolutions enforce penalties if 
violated, thus keeping North Korea in check as North Korea would be aware that the US is prepared to 
enforce and carry out all penalties if it defects. Currently however, North Korea is aware that the US 
cannot enforce sanctions without the support of key allies, namely, South Korea and China. In order to 
attain the support of these allies, the current Administration needs to avoid the mistakes of the Bush 
Administration that failed to attain the support of allies in adopting a tougher stance with North Korea.  
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The Bush Administration failed to persuade its allies that it was serious about negotiations, given the 
inflexible and uncompromising policy it adopted when dealing with North Korea, insisting for CVID 
before negotiation on aid and assistance for instance.404 As such, gaining the approval of allies to adopt 
a tougher position against North Korea became impossible. If negotiations, negotiations as pursued by 
the US, failed, which they inevitably did, the Bush Administration did not have the support of the allies 
to pursue a tougher stance toward North Korea.405  Post-test analyses argues that the situation is now 
moving toward a point where there is a greater chance that the US would have to deal with a North 
Korea with more nuclear weapons aiming for nuclear status. The best way to avoid such a scenario 
would be to unite the US and its allies around a common policy that could deal with a North Korea that 
still maintains a threatening posture. In order to secure this unity, the Obama Administration would 
need to implement engagement policies with North Korea. The allies will not adopt coercive measures 
until they are certain that all polices of engagement have been adopted to test North Korea’s repeated 
statements for a negotiated settlement. If the US therefore illustrates that engagement has been used 
and failed, then only can unity and support be given by the allies who can no longer find fault in US 
engagement practices. The US needs to show firm commitment by not only simply mentioning, but 
actually implementing genuine bilateral engagement with North Korea, which has continually been 
called for by all allies.406 
Various statements made by the Obama Administration however represent a policy of engagement very 
similar to that of the Bush Administration. Statements such as, “The door is open to resolving these 
issues peacefully…but it will only happen if North Korea is taking serious steps around the nuclear 
issue,”407 and “we are open to bilateral meeting as part of the six-party process if that will lead to an 
expeditious resumption of the denuclearization negotiations.”408 Both these statements once again 
represent the prospect of engagement based on denuclearization. This is very similar then to the 
inflexible and uncompromising policy of the Bush Administration that offered the prospect of 
negotiation and incentives only if North Korea agreed to denuclearization. It was this inflexible and 
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uncompromising policy that prevented any genuine engagement between the US and North Korea and 
that ultimately caused the US to fail in securing the support of allies. The Obama Administrations 
inflexible policy based on conditionality’s is seen again in the statement by Secretary of State, Hillary 
Clinton: 
“If North Korea is genuinely prepared to completely and verifiably eliminate their nuclear 
weapons program, the Obama Administration will be willing to normalize relations, replace the 
peninsula’s longstanding armistice agreements with a permanent peace treaty, and assist in 
meeting the energy and other economic needs of the North Korean people,” (Clinton, February, 
2009)409 
Statements such as these do not represent a break from the past policy of the Bush Administration. 
There is very little difference from this to the Bush Administrations offer to provide aid, assistance and a 
negative security assurance only after North Korea achieved complete, verifiable and irreversible 
dismantlement of its nuclear program.410 Further similarities in the US response to North Korean 
provocative behavior between the Bush and Obama Administration are evident in addition. Similar to 
the responses of the Bush Administration, President Obama responded to North Korea’s May nuclear 
testing with strong words stating that “the danger posed by North Korea’s threatening activities 
warrants action by the international community.”411 If the traditional explanations on the reasons for 
North Korean provocative behavior are considered again at this point, one could deduce that such a 
response by the US, stating the possibility of action being taken against North Korea, will only fuel North 
Korean insecurities further, and provide North Korea with a reason to retaliate against this perceived US 
threat and thus the need to maintain a nuclear deterrent.  A further example of the current 
Administrations policy that stands only to further antagonize North Korea can be seen in a statement 
made by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Clinton suggested the possibility that North Korea be placed 
back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, the only step taken by the US, under the Bush 
Administration, to normalize relations with North Korea.412 This would essentially mean going a step 
back, instead of moving forward. This would then be similar to the Bush Administrations adoption of a 
more hard-line policy of hawk engagement over genuine engagement with North Korea set up by the 
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Clinton Administration that brought notable progress and development. Instead of building on this 
progress and securing further improvement, the Bush Administration opted for a policy that took the 
situation back to crisis point.  
A further example of a weakness in the current Administrations North Korean policy, which fails to break 
from the previous, failed policy of the Bush Administration, is evident in the maintenance of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI was launched by the Bush Administration in 2003 as a 
response to the Administrations aim to prevent the sale and transfer of nuclear materials or 
technologies from North Korea to other state or non-state actors.413 The PSI aimed to prevent this 
proliferation through preventive interdiction of shipments in question by land, sea or air. North Korea 
saw this as a coercive initiative that resulted in a great amount of tension and instability. The PSI 
affected US-South Korean relations as South Korea initially resisted joining the PSI to avoid antagonizing 
North Korea.414 The standoff in relations between North Korea and the current Administration is said to 
be based on choices that the administration makes, which affects North Korean behavior, according to 
the traditional arguments on North Korean brinkmanship.415 These choices therefore can be potentially 
dangerous and unreliable as a policy choice could cause a provocative North Korean response that will 
only exacerbate tensions further. The PSI is just one such policy choice representive of this argument. 
The maintenance of the PSI, that caused an increase in tension, illustrates another similarity between 
the Bush and Obama Administration policies. In looking to the traditional arguments on the reasons for 
North Korean strategies of brinkmanship that promotes provocative behavior based on North Korean 
insecurities, President Obama should have recognized that the maintenance of a policy considered by 
the North Koreans as coercive would do little in allowing for cooperation from North Korea. When South 
Korea joined the PSI following the May nuclear testing by North Korea for instance, North Korea 
responded by calling this a ‘declaration of war.’416 North Korea considered the South Korean move to an 
agreement with the US as South Korean disregarded of North Korea’s sovereignty. While North Korea 
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increased military threats, South Korea strengthened their defences.417 This clearly represents a 
situation in which the PSI fueled an already tense situation and led only to more instability. 
 Statements then, by the Secretary of State that the US “will do everything we (US) can to both interdict 
it and prevent it and shut off their flow of money,” would only antagonize North Korea further and 
increase overall tension.418 The increase of friction in North Korean relations with the US is evident in 
North Korea having described itself as a ‘proud nuclear state’ that threatened to strike the US if 
provoked as the US tracked one of the North Korean ships.419 North Korea stated that “It is a great 
mistake for the US to think that it will not be hurt if it ignores this and ignites the fuse of war on the 
Korean peninsula,” to which the US responded, “This administration-and our military-is fully prepared 
for any contingencies.”420 This again therefore is a clear example of the tensions and increase in hostility 
caused by the continued pursuit of a policy which North Korea considers a grave threat to its sovereignty 
and generally considers coercive. 
Not only is the PSI increasing tension and hostility in US-North Korean relations, but tensions are caused 
in addition in inter-Korean relations. North Korea’s most recent military threat to South Korea occurred 
in November 2009 when North Korea stated that South Korea would pay an ‘extensive price’ for firing at 
a North Korean boat.421 This was the first naval conflict in seven years and again illustrates the manner in 
which the PSI stands only to exacerbate tensions further.422 In line with the PSI furthermore, the current 
Administration circulated a draft resolution which urges UN members to cut loans, financial assistance 
and grants to North Korea for all programs linked to military and nuclear programs.423 This once again 
represents a link to the previous administrations policy whereby the Bush Administration had frozen $24 
million in North Korean accounts.424 The Obama Administration seeks to expand on these measures 
which will once again, according to traditional explanations on North Korean brinkmanship, drive North 
Korea further toward nuclear developments as the only option and deterrent against such 




 Symonds, P. “Obama moves aggressively against North Korea,”  World Socialist Website, 
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/jun2009/kore-j10.shtml, 10 June 2009. 
419
 “North Korea says to hit back at US if attacked,” Defence Talk, http://www.defencetalk.com/north-korea-says-to-




 “North Korea makes new threat as Obama arrives in Asia,” Reuters, 




 Symonds, P. “Obama moves aggressively against North Korea,”  World Socialist Website, 
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/jun2009/kore-j10.shtml, 10 June 2009. 
424
 Wit, J., “Enhancing U.S. Engagement with North Korea,” in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2, Spring 
2007, p. 62 
78 | P a g e  
 
developments. Critics view the previous Administrations freezing of North Korean accounts as serious 
misstep as the Administration was completing the 2005 joint communiqué.425 In a similar argument 
then, one could deduce that the current administrations pursuit of a policy aiming for the same 
objective is a serious misstep as it seeks to continue to encourage North Korea to return to the six party 
talks. It would be counter-productive to pursue a policy that antagonizes North Korea while at the same 
time seeking to encourage North Korea to negotiate and cooperate.                            
Linked to the traditional explanations of North Korean provocative behavior as a strategy of 
brinkmanship based on North Korean insecurity, statements by President Obama stressing the potential 
of ‘consequences’ if Iran fails to demonstrate peaceful nuclear ambitions will not tame these North 
Korean insecurities.426 North Korea might conclude that just like the Bush Administration, the current 
Administration follows a hard-line policy that threatens action if certain conditions are not met. Various 
arguments therefore state that the current Administration has made the mistake of signaling a more 
aggressive stance toward North Korea that will only aggravate an already tense situation, much like 
what the Bush Administration had done.427  Further similarities to the Bush Administration are seen in 
statements by Obama saying “We are not intending to continue a policy of rewarding provocation,” very 
similar to President Bush’s repeated declarations that the US would not “reward North Korea for bad 
behavior.”428 The Obama Administration furthermore does not seem to break from the past as it 
maintains a policy of not wanting to offer North Korea any further incentives, a point reinforced by 
Obama’s chief strategist stating that “Clinton bought it once, Bush bought it again, and we’re not going 
to buy it a third time.”429 This strategy however, strictly pursued by the Bush Administration, failed to 
raise the stakes in negotiation for North Korea, as proposed by the prospect theory discussed in chapter 
two. The Clinton Administration had illustrated positive progress in containing the North Korean nuclear 
threat by offering incentives that raised the stake for North Korea in negotiations. North Korea was 
aware that any defection could cost them various incentives of aid and assistance promised under the 
Agreed Framework. With US delays however in constructing the LWRs, despite North Korea abiding by 
the established proposals, North Korea chose to defect and resort once again to provocative behavior. 
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This occurred again following the agreement established at the conclusion of the six-party talks in 2007. 
This agreement broke down once again due to delays in US promises and reluctance to offer genuine 
incentives from which North Korea can gain from upholding its end of the bargain.430             
 The Obama Administration should therefore implement a strategy toward North Korea that the Bush 
Administration failed to adopt. The Obama Administration should not run the risk of being criticized for 
having an aggressive, uncompromising and inflexible policy similar to that of the Bush Administration. 
The Obama Administration furthermore should avoid presenting an ‘all or nothing’ package to North 
Korea, much like what the Bush Administration had done.431 The following suggestions and 
recommendations would therefore need to be considered. 
4.3 Recommendations:                  
A former Bush Administration official stated that a key factor that led to the failure of the Bush 
Administration in neutralizing the North Korean threat, was the inability of the Administration to 
determine at what price North Korea would actually be willing to surrender its nuclear program.432 By 
adopting a strict policy of hawk engagement, the Administration represented their skepticism in the 
possibility that engagement would bring success.433 The Administration chose instead to look to the 
behavior of North Korea, which they felt did not reflect a deeper and fundamental change in North 
Korean intentions. As such, the Administration refused to engage with a regime they felt will not 
reciprocate even when given various incentives.434 This led the Administration therefore to maintain an 
inflexible and uncompromising policy of conditionality, where cooperation and incentives were possible 
only if North Korea agreed to complete and verifiable denuclearization, as discussed previously. The 
Administration failed therefore to recognize the fact that for North Korea, denuclearization would only 
occur through a normalization of relations, rather than normalization through denuclearization. 
Engagement then, would have been the best policy choice that would allow for the normalization of 
relations and the provision of incentives or ‘carrots’ that would reduce North Korea’s threat perception 
of the US and therefore, North Korean insecurity, moving North Korea away then from its only policy 
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option of proliferation and instead, toward reform.435 This is a policy option that should then be 
considered by the Obama Administration. 
The Obama Administration should adopt a policy of genuine engagement that offers North Korea 
concrete incentives in an attempt to normalize political and economic relations.436 The current 
Administration should therefore avoid the failure of the Bush Administrations inflexible and 
uncompromising policy where incentives were only offered once North Korea denuclearized. The 
Obama Administration should instead, in line with the prospect theory, provide North Korea with 
various incentives or ‘carrots’ that will then give North Korea a stake in the negotiation, placing North 
Korea in the area of gain, where any provocative action would threaten this position.437 At the same 
time then, this approach will prevent the preemptive/preventive logic whereby North Korea maintains 
policies of brinkmanship and coercive diplomacy to achieve engagement and gain concessions. If the US 
implements and maintains a genuine policy of engagement and provides with concrete incentives, the 
reason for North Korean insecurity and the need for strategies of brinkmanship lessen.438 If the US 
continues however, to maintain an inflexible policy where it prioritizes denuclearization as a condition 
necessary if benefits are to be given, North Korea will continue to see itself in the area of loss which will 
simply maintain North Korean insecurity and sense of vulnerability where North Korea would therefore 
maintain the belief that deterrence against an offensive and uncompromising US is better accomplished 
through nuclear weapons, rather than negotiation based on conditionality.439 The Obama Administration 
would therefore need to change these dynamics and raise the stakes for North Korea in negotiation that 
would have a greater chance of preventing North Korea from defecting.  
As discussed previously, North Korea faces the dilemma of being presented with a US deal to give up its 
nuclear weapons program and then receive large amounts of benefits.440 The dilemma North Korea 
faces however, is giving up its only strongest bargaining chip that provides it with policy leverage. 
Looking to the past furthermore, North Korea will recognize that throughout all previous agreements, 
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while North Korea abided by key points of the agreement, the US had delayed on the provision of 
important incentives as part of the agreement. The delay in the provision of the LWRs for instance, 
promised under the Agreed Framework, as disused previously. In light of this, North Korea would be 
hesitant to give up its only strongest bargaining tool having no guarantee that the US would abide by all 
agreements. The Obama Administration would do well therefore to set up policy objectives that are 
implemented and achieved. 
The Clinton Administration, in turning to a policy of genuine engagement that provided North Korea 
with incentives represented that North Korea is indeed willing to end the production, testing and export 
of ballistic missiles if it can get the right price.441 This provides with a positive sign then that the policy of 
engagement and the provision of incentives does indeed provide with the potential of substantial 
progress. The Clinton Administrations policy of engagement that resulted in the adoption of the Agreed 
Framework demonstrated a pattern in North Korean behavior that the Obama Administration should 
consider. When the US adopted an aggressive and hostile policy, North Korea responded with more 
coercive diplomacy but in contrast, responded with a more cooperative attitude when it received 
concessions.442 This would be in keeping with the traditional explanations on the reasons for North 
Korea’s provocative and threatening acts. This policy alternative would therefore be essential for the 
current administration to consider. 
If however, one looks to the post-test analyses that explain North Korea’s provocative actions as a sign 
of North Korea’s true intentions of seeking to maintain their nuclear program and gain the status of a 
nuclear state, then an alternative policy option is suggested, that seeks to work alongside and not 
parallel to the first policy option. This policy option suggests that the Obama Administration pursue a 
policy whereby it provides North Korea with ‘carrots’ thereby raising the stakes for North Korea by 
placing it in an area of gain. If however, post-test analyses proves correct, the Obama Administration 
would need a policy to address the chance of potential North Korean hostility. Again, the argument for 
engagement is used to address this issue. Genuine engagement that provides incentives for North Korea 
will allow the US to build a coalition for punishment at a later stage if North Korea continues with 
provocative behavior.443 As discussed previously, the Bush Administration had failed to secure the 
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support of key allies to pursue a stronger policy against North Korea when North Korea carried out 
provocative acts. If the current Administration however, clearly indicates a policy that implements 
genuine engagement and provides with concrete incentives, if North Korea still defects, the current 
Administration would be in a better position to show that engagement had failed, and stricter policies 
are needed. This is a point that is furthered by former Deputy of State, Richard Armitage stating that 
“diplomacy strengthens the ability to build and sustain a coalition if North Korea does not cooperate.” 
444 In addition, if north Korea does defect and continue with provocative behavior, by having provided 
with ‘carrots’ that raise the stakes for North Korea, the current Administration would be in a better 
position to turn these ‘carrots’ into ‘sticks’  and punish any future provocative behavior. Engagement 
therefore, in all instances, will allow the current administration to prevent the crystallization of 
conditions that promote North Korean strategies of brinkmanship and coercive diplomacy.445 This 
argument supports both the traditional argument of the reasons for North Korean provocative behavior 
and in addition supports the post-test analyses on North Korean provocative acts. This suggestion 
provides a policy option that lessens North Korea insecurity and thus has a greater potential of moving 
North Korea away from its current preemptive/preventive logic where coercive diplomacy and 
brinkmanship is the only option as there is no better alternative. At the same time, this suggestion 
recognizes the fact that North Korea may not be willing to fully give up its nuclear option and thus 
maintains a strategy that will allow for an alternative policy should North Korea defect. Many arguments 
find that North Korea will continue to play the same game, using the tool of brinkmanship and coercive 
diplomacy, the difference is how the current Administration plays the game.446 The policy suggestion 
given provides a double sided sword that allows for robust and genuine engagement that will facilitate 
engagement and at the same time, lays the groundwork for the US to acquire defensive tools to use 
against North Korea, should North Korea defect.447                      
4.4 Looking to the Future 
An important issue regarding succession in North Korea has arisen resulting from Kim Jong-Il’s 
deteriorating health.448 This issue has important implications that the current administration would need 
to face. Given the highly institutionalized totalitarian governing system, the new leadership is most likely 
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to inherit and maintain this system and its policies. The most likely successor is said to be Kim Jong-Il’s 
third son, Kim Jong-un. It is important to note that the ability of the new leadership to adopt new 
policies is limited to the resources available, and for North Korea, these resources continue to be the 
nuclear and ballistic missiles that remain the only internationally competitive policy tools that North 
Korea has. The chance therefore of a change in North Korean policies with a change in leadership is 
unlikely. The Obama Administration should therefore avoid the mistake of the previous Administration 
that prioritized regime change as a solution to the North Korean problem. The North Korean regime 
cannot be treated as temporary, and as such, US policy cannot change upon North Korean regime 
change.449 
There is however a chance for the new leader not to adopt the historical negative ‘baggage’ of Kim-Jong 
Il, and if in addition, this new leader manages to fulfill the minimum necessary demands of China, South 
Korea, Japan and Russia, illustrating a new decency in the conduct of both external and internal policies, 
there would then be a greater chance for progress through cooperation and engagement.450 
The current Administration should not however wait for this to happen given the fact that the 26-year 
old, Kim Jong-un is not domestically established and is thus more likely to rely on the military support 
and past policies of  his father’s regime.451 Some positive aspects are however put forth regarding Kim 
Jong-un’s education that occurred abroad. This is said to present the possibility explained before, that 
this new leader could be more open to negotiation with the international community. It is suggested 
that Obama Administration is currently following a ‘wait-and-see’ approach in dealing with North Korea 
given these questions and issues around succession. The US, it seems, is waiting then to adjust its 
diplomatic strategies accordingly, pending the issue of North Korean succession. This is evident in the 
Administrations current contradictory approach in which it commits to the strategy not to reward North 
Korean provocative behavior while stating that it will not abandon diplomacy. Diplomacy, as discussed 
previously, would require a genuine form of engagement that would provide North Korea with concrete 
incentives, thereby raising the stakes for North Korea and lessening North Korean strategies of 
brinkmanship that promoted provocation. An example of this contradiction is seen in the US statement 
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to send a US envoy to North Korea, which when accepted by North Korea, the US switched and insisted 
instead that North Korea return to the six party talks first.452 
 The Obama Administration cannot risk the failure of the previous Administrations contradictory polices 
of conditionality, nor can the current Administration wait to change and alter policy objectives according 
to North Korean succession. While maintaining the current policy of conditionality in insisting that North 
Korea agree to denuclearization before any incentives are given, North Korea will continue building and 
advancing what they still see as their only option, their nuclear program.453 The Obama Administration 
should therefore avoid the previous Administrations mistake in fitting threats to policy, instead of policy 
to threats.454  This is an important point to consider given the views of Bruce Klingner.455 Mr. Klingner 
explains that one should not perhaps be asking the question of whether the US failed but rather, did 
North Korea never intend to give up their nuclear program?456 If this is indeed the case, the Obama 
Administration would do well to avoid the mistake of fitting policy to threats, but should rather look to 
the true intentions of North Korea in their nuclear program and adopt a policy to deal with this 
situation. In Mr. Klingners view, the common denominator to all the different US approaches, is North 
Korea’s refusal to abide by its commitments.457 In order for the Obama Administration then to bring 
notable progress that previous administrations could not, all suggestions and recommendation provided 
would need to be considered. Jim Hoare458 suggests and reaffirms the views that a more conciliatory 
approach is needed where engagement would prove the best option.459 War or any form of intervention 
in Mr. Hoare’s views carries too many dangers for surrounding countries.460  
Another important suggestion for an alternative policy looks to the formation of close cooperation with 
key allies in the region. Given North Korea’s continual deception and lack of commitment to agreed 
upon policies, a closer US alliance, pursed by the Obama administration could stand as a useful policy 
alternative. Closer US alliance with China for instance is important for two reasons. Firstly, as a close ally 
to North Korea, China could become a useful partner to the US in its relations with North Korea while 
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secondly; the US can simultaneously improve relations with China in forming a closer alliance.461 China is 
said to fear the emergence of an unfriendly regime in unified Korea and if the Obama administrations 
efforts to build regional cohesion and close US-Sino cooperation are to prove successful, the US will 
need to clarify and build relations with China in order to tame Chinese fears by clarifying US intentions 
and providing reassurance thereby allowing in this way for more effective progress toward regional 
cohesion.462  
Although China does indeed have a great interest on superpower status, China may be more willing to 
settle for a status quo over any instability to the point of accepting a unified Korea led by South Korea 
and the US, having invested so heavily in North Korea. The Obama administration would therefore need 
to form closer dialogue with China about the future of the Korean peninsula and principles of a united 
Korea. By forming a closer allegiance with China, North Korea would be more convinced of a mobilized 
coercive front against North Korean nuclear programs. Furthermore, a more mobilized and cooperative 
US-China alliance would demonstrate to North Korea more mobilized coercive measures that would be 
more effective in preventing the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, North Korea could become 
increasingly aware that taking the path toward denuclearization could provide them with new 
opportunities in the form of expanded economic and political benefits coming from a closer US-China 
alliance. 463 North Korea would be more willing to denuclearize if it sees greater potential benefits to 
come from denuclearization. 
This chapter has provided discussions on the reasons for North Korean nuclear developments and 
implications of this threat and has proceeded to provide with policy options available to the current 
Administration to address these threats and avoid the mistakes of the past. Only genuine engagement 
that follows from, rather than precedes the normalization of relations, will bring greater possibilities for 
a resolution.464  
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Chapter five: Conclusion 
The purpose of this study intended to analyse the Bush Administration’s North Korean policy, ultimately 
aiming to determine whether this policy proved a success or failure in neutralizing the North Korean 
nuclear threat.   
The first chapter of this study began with a discussion and look at the North Korean nuclear threat. The 
purpose of this chapter attempted to state the existing and growing dangers of the North Korean 
nuclear program and thus outline the implication of these dangers. This chapter has firstly provided with 
a discussion on the reasons why North Korea possesses and continues to develop nuclear weapons. The 
main reasons stated looked to nuclear weapons development as a vital element to ensure the continued 
existence of the Kim family regime, mainly against the perceived US threat to North Korean sovereignty. 
This chapter has provided with various reasons and evidence of North Korean fears and concerns, 
particularly during the term of the Bush Administration, regarding the determination of the US to 
achieve regime change in Pyongyang.  
The chapter therefore went on to discuss the important North Korean strategy of brinkmanship 
whereby North Korea avoided transparency in missile and nuclear development as they sought to build 
a military powerful state. Nuclear weapons therefore served as an important tool whereby North Korea 
could simply create the perception of being a military powerful state in order to prevent threats to its 
sovereignty or to achieve various concessions. In addition, in developing and maintaining a nuclear 
program to ensure state survival against the US threat, the strategy of brinkmanship illustrated the 
manner in which North Korea was able to use their nuclear program as leverage to attain economic 
incentives that in addition to military developments, ensures state survival. This is what is referred to as 
North Korea’s defensive power against the US offensive power. The strategy of brinkmanship in addition 
has illustrated the ways in which North Korean provocation has simply increased tension and suspicion 
within East Asia and will continue as long as North Korea perceives a threat to its sovereignty.  
This chapter has in addition looked to the growing capabilities of the North Korean nuclear program that 
therefore demands immediate attention from the US today. Not only is North Korea successfully 
developing and advancing nuclear capabilities, but North Korea is said to be the largest exporter of 
missile technologies. The implications of these developments prove dangerous as sales are made to 
other rogue nations and possibly other non-state actors under no monitoring system. Proliferation 
dangers and increases in the possibility of threats to peace and stability within various unstable regions 
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escalate furthermore when looking to the implications of the North Korean withdrawal from the NPT. 
This chapter has looked to these implications explaining the manner in which North Korean withdrawal 
could threaten the erosion of NPT compliance norms which thus begins to serve as a medium through 
which Korean peninsula developments drive other proliferation dangers, Iranian ambitions for instance.  
The lack of transparency, information and knowledge regarding North Korean nuclear developments 
only increases suspicion as the international community is left to speculation and assumption that only 
fuels uncertainty and thereby raises tension and hostility. This situation is then compounded by the 
adoption of policies of brinkmanship by North Korea that again does not allow for a conducive and 
productive environment to promote constructive negotiation. In light of these discussions therefore, the 
dangers and implications of a nuclear North Korea are clear. The need therefore to neutralize this threat 
is essential in preserving and maintaining global standards of peace and stability. This chapter has thus 
explained and illustrated the key reason for North Korean nuclear development as a defensive deterrent 
based on their insecurity against the US aggressive policy aimed at regime change in Pyongyang. This 
insecurity leads North Korea to pursue a policy of brinkmanship and coercive bargaining, by maintaining 
a nuclear program. 
After having established the context of the North Korean situation, the study proceeded to analyse the 
US policy toward this threat and issue. Chapter three began with an analysis on the Clinton 
Administration’s North Korean policy in order to provide with a background and context of US-North 
Korean relations prior to the arrival of the Bush Administration. The analysis of the Clinton 
Administration made the main point that positive policies of engagement adopted by this 
Administration allowed for and facilitated an improvement in US-North Korean relations and the 
containment of the North Korean nuclear threat. The engagement policies adopted by the Clinton 
Administration culminated into the Agreed Framework that promised further improvements in US-North 
Korean relations and showed clear signs of improved North Korean behavior, away from aggressive 
policies of brinkmanship. The Clinton Administration turned to a policy of engagement despite 
condemnations from hard-liners that engagement would amount to appeasement that would simply 
encourage North Korean threat and wayward, deviant behavior. The Administration recognised that well 
placed concessions can essentially have a controlling effect on a country that needs the cooperation and 
assistance of the outside world. The chapter then went on to discuss how this success and progress in 
the normalization of US-North Korean relations and the containment of the North Korean nuclear threat 
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became compromised upon the election of the Bush Administration when a shift in policy saw 
engagement replaced by a hard-line policy of hawk engagement.  
This chapter used the policy of hawk engagement pursued by the Bush Administration to illustrate the 
reversal away from policies of engagement to more hard-line policies with the sole objective of 
achieving regime change in Pyongyang. In pursuing a more hard-line policy, the Bush Administration 
presented engagement as an incentive to be gained by North Korea only if North Korea agreed to 
complete disarmament. This chapter therefore illustrated this Administrations North Korean policy that 
did not further the Clinton Administration’s policy of engagement and cooperation, but instead provided 
a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ policy by refusing to provide ‘carrots’ or incentives unless North Korea met certain 
demands. The analysis of this policy then illustrated how and why North Korea returned back to 
traditional strategies of brinkmanship as this more hostile US policy only fueled North Korean fears and 
insecurities. The hostile policy of hawk engagement that refused to ‘award bad behavior’ failed to 
provide North Korea with a stake in negotiations. As such, North Korea’s main stake remained once 
again in the development and maintenance of their nuclear program. The Bush Administration should 
have been aware of the dynamics of North Korean brinkmanship that responds in a threatening manner 
to a perceived threat. Instead therefore of having continued with a hard-line aggressive policy, the 
Administration should have continued the engagement policy of the Clinton Administration that 
established a framework for progress that the Bush Administration could have furthered. This firm, 
inflexible and uncompromising US policy was met therefore by a more threatening and provocative 
North Korea that simply went on to strengthen nuclear capabilities. 
In having analysed the implications of such a policy, the chapter then went on to suggest various 
recommendations on the path that should have been taken instead. The prospect theory was used to 
illustrate a policy objective that should have been adopted by the Bush Administration. Engagement and 
the provision of incentives, as proposed under the prospect theory, would prevent the crystallization of 
conditions under which North Korea calculates aggression and a threatening posture as its only course 
of action.  The chapter states the important point that the provision of incentives places North Korea in 
an area of gain where North Korea now has a stake in the negotiation process and would therefore be 
less likely to defect and risk losing this stake. The policy of engagement and the provision of incentives 
furthermore, lays the groundwork for a coalition of punishment at a later stage if North Korea defects. 
The Bush Administration however, chose immediately to use incentives as sticks without having given 
North Korea a stake in the status quo. By pursuing a policy of engagement therefore, that provides 
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various incentives to North Korea thereby raising North Korean stakes in the status quo; the US is able to 
tactically build a coalition of punishment should North Korea defect. Engagement therefore, in this 
manner, facilitates a policy that will ensure progress and at the same time, maintain a security net to 
respond to North Korean defiance.  
The final chapter of this study then went on to discuss the road ahead and the future prospects for the 
Obama Administration. The chapter began with an outline of North Korean provocative acts that were 
carried out just before and after the election of the Obama Administration. These provocative acts were 
analysed in two ways. Firstly, these provocative acts were seen to be in line with the traditional North 
Korean strategy of brinkmanship, aimed to get the attention of the new Administration and ensure 
negotiation. The second analysis however, considered a new approach regarding the reason for and 
implication of North Korean provocative and hostile acts. Post-test analyses of North Korean acts in 
April, May and July 2009 was used to represent a new dynamic in considering the true intentions of 
North Korea. It has been suggested that what North Korea really wants is to be accepted as a nuclear 
state by the US. This argument states that North Korea could be aiming, through more provocative acts, 
to turn the six party talks, which the Obama Administration has pushed for from the outset, into 
bilateral US-North Korean nuclear arms negotiations. In looking to both the traditional North Korean 
strategy of brinkmanship and the new dynamic of North Korean intentions under post-test analyses, 
various suggestions are given on approaches to be taken by this Administration in dealing with North 
Korea, in either setting. 
 It has been suggested that the Obama Administration adopt a policy of genuine engagement that offers 
North Korea concrete incentives in an attempt to normalize political and economic relations. The 
current Administration should therefore avoid the failure of the Bush Administrations inflexible and 
uncompromising policy where incentives were only offered once North Korea denuclearized. The 
Obama Administration should instead, in line with the prospect theory, provide North Korea with 
various incentives or ‘carrots’ that will then give North Korea a stake in the negotiation, placing North 
Korea in the area of gain, where any provocative action would threaten this position. This would 
therefore lead North Korea away from traditional strategies of brinkmanship. If however, one looks to 
the post-test analyses that explain North Korea’s provocative actions as a sign of North Korea’s true 
intentions of seeking to maintain their nuclear program and gain the status of a nuclear state, then an 
alternative policy option is suggested, that seeks to work alongside and not parallel to the first policy 
option. This policy option suggests that the Obama Administration pursue a policy whereby it provides 
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North Korea with ‘carrots’ thereby raising the stakes for North Korea by placing it in an area of gain. If 
however, post-test analyses proves correct, the Obama Administration would need a policy to address 
the chance of potential North Korean hostility. Again, the argument for engagement is used to address 
this issue. Genuine engagement that provides incentives for North Korea will allow the US to build a 
coalition for punishment at a later stage if North Korea continues with provocative behavior. As 
discussed previously, the Bush Administration had failed to secure the support of key allies to pursue a 
stronger policy against North Korea when North Korea carried out provocative acts. If the current 
Administration however, clearly indicates a policy that implements genuine engagement and provides 
with concrete incentives, if North Korea still defects, the current Administration would be in a better 
position to show that engagement had failed, and stricter policies are needed. In addition, if north Korea 
does defect and continue with provocative behavior, by having provided with ‘carrots’ that raise the 
stakes for North Korea, the current Administration would be in a better position to turn these ‘carrots’ 
into ‘sticks’  and punish any future provocative behavior. Engagement therefore, in all instances, will 
allow the current administration to prevent the crystallization of conditions that promote North Korean 
strategies of brinkmanship and coercive diplomacy. This argument supports both the traditional 
argument of the reasons for North Korean provocative behavior and in addition supports the post-test 
analyses on North Korean provocative acts. 
This chapter has made the important point that the current Administration should avoid the previous 
Administrations mistake in fitting threats to policy, instead of policy to threats.  Many arguments find 
that North Korea will continue to play the same game, using the tool of brinkmanship and coercive 
diplomacy, the difference will be how the current Administration plays the game. The policy suggestion 
given provides a double sided sword that allows for robust and genuine engagement that will facilitate 
engagement and at the same time, lays the groundwork for the US to acquire defensive tools to use 
against North Korea, should North Korea defect. 
      
            
 
  




Bertil Lintner:  A Swedish journalist whose main specialty and focus is based on North Korea 
and Laos. Bertil Lintner was a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review and 
is currently a writer with Asia-Pacific Media Services.   Bertil Lintner has written numerous 
articles and books that include “Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North Korea under the 
Kim Clan.” This book is an expose on North Korea that traces the origins of the Kim family’s 
ideologies and investigates North Korean missile and nuclear developments. Bertil Lintner is 
one of the very few journalists to have visited North Korea and as such, is able to ‘demystify 
rather than demonize’ North Korea by allowing a look behind the walls of secrecy and many 
misperceptions that surround North Korea. In 2004, Bertil Lintner received an award for 
excellence in reporting about North Korea from the Society of Publishers in Asia. 
Source: Asia Pacific Media Services Limited, http://www.asiapacificms.com/books/. 
           Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HF03Ae01.html, June 3 2006.  
B. 
Bruce Klingner:  A Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's 
Asian Studies Center. Bruce Klingners area of expertise lies in Korea and Japan. In 1993, he was 
selected as Chief of CIA's Korea Branch which provided analytic reports on military 
developments during the nuclear crisis with North Korea. From 1996-2001, Klingner was the 
Deputy Chief for Korea in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence where he was responsible for 
analyzing Korean political, military, economic and leadership issues for the president and other 
senior policymakers. Bruce Klingner has written numerous articles that have appeared in 
several media publishing’s including the Financial Times, The Washington Times, USA Today and 
the Korea Policy Review journal; while his comments and analysis have appeared in CNN, CNN 
International and Al Jazeera TV among many others. 
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